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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
Plaintiffs

appeal

an

Order

of

Dismissal

entered

by

the

Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen of the Fourth Judicial District
Court,

Utah

County,

State

of

Utah.

The

Supreme

Court

has

jurisdiction of this civil appeal under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2
(1992), and has transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court had

jurisdiction to dismiss

Plaintiffs' case when Plaintiffs' petition for interlocutory appeal
had been denied over six months before the dismissal.
Standard of Review:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss
the case is a determination of law and is reviewed by
this Court for correctness.
Ohline Corp. v. Granite
Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah App. 1993). Plaintiffs'
argument was not raised in the trial court.
2•

Whether the trial court abused its broad discretion when

it dismissed Plaintiffs' case, pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b), for
failure to prosecute the case to trial.
Standard of Review;
Dismissal under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute
is a decision within the broad discretion of the trial
court. This Court will not interfere with that decision
unless it clearly appears that the court has abused its
discretion and there is a likelihood an injustice has
resulted. Country Meadows v. Dept. of Health, 851 P.2d
1212, 1214 (Utah App. 1993); Charlie Brown Const. Co. v.
Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App.
1987) .
-127374.NI211.8500

3.

Whether

the

trial

court's

partial

summary

judgment

dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for damages for emotional distress
was rendered moot when the court dismissed Plaintiffs' case under
Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b).
Standard of Review:
Whether an interlocutory ruling below is now moot is
an original determination by the appellate court without
regard to the rulings below. When the trial court has
properly exercised its discretion under Rule 41(b), the
appellate court will not review prior interlocutory
rulings. Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah
App. 1989).
DETERMINATIVE RULES
Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b) as set forth in Defendants' Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants disagree with Plaintiffs' statement of the case,
and submit the following statement which accurately reflects the
facts and proceedings herein. In doing sof Defendants refer to the
Record as "R.

" (citing the page); depositions are referred to

by deponent, volume and page number, i.e. "
p.

"; and

documents

from the

record which

Depo., Vol.

,

are contained

in

Defendants' Addendum are arranged, insofar as possible, in record
number order and referred to as "Ad.

-227374 .N1211.8500

."

A.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs filed this action against Pat B. Brian and Nielsen

& Senior for alleged malpractice by Defendants as attorneys while
representing Plaintiffs, the adopting parents in an adoption.

B.

Course of Proceedings
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint asserted five claims for

relief, framed as
negligence,"

(1) "breach of contract,"

(2) "professional

(3) "negligent infliction of emotional distress,"

(4) "intentional infliction (by Pat B. Brian only) of emotional
distress," and (5) "negligent misrepresentation."
Partial

summary

judgment

by

the

trial

court

dismissed

Plaintiffs' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
intentional

infliction

misrepresentation.
After

over

of

emotional

distress,

and

negligent

[R.1371, R.1498, R.1616]

two

and

one-half

years, seven

attorneys

for

Plaintiffs and continued nonaction by Plaintiffs, Defendants moved
with supporting memorandum to dismiss Plaintiffs' action pursuant
to Utah R.Civ.P. 41(b), for failure to prosecute the case with
diligence.
conference,

[Ad.
during

G]

Oral

which

both

representations to the court.
recorded.

Following

oral

argument
parties

was

held

made

by

telephone

numerous

factual

The telephone argument was not

argument, the

trial

court

granted

Defendants' motion, and findings of fact and conclusions of law and
an order of dismissal were entered on April 6, 1993.

[Ad. B, C]

Plaintiffs' separate motions for new trial were denied by Judge
-327374 .NI211.8500

Christoffersen.

[R.2167, 2173]

Plaintiffs filed this appeal.

[R.2177]

C.

Statement of Material Facts
Although Plaintiffs attack the findings, they fail to marshal

the evidence supporting the findings and show its inadequacy as a
matter of law.

Instead, Plaintiffs rely upon their own selective

version of the "facts."

Defendants therefore state the pertinent

facts supporting the dismissal as primarily contained within the
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
Ad. C]

[R.1877-1861;

References to the specific Findings in Addendum C are

"Finding No.

1.

."

The Adoption.
In January, 1986, Defendant Pat B. Brian was a member of

Nielsen & Senior and had not yet been appointed to the district
court bench.

He was retained by Plaintiffs to represent them in

adopting a child to be born in June 1986.

[Finding Nos. 1, 2]

Plaintiffs had already made arrangements with the expectant mother
to adopt her baby.
pp.

538-44]

confirmed

[Finding No. 1; James Johnson Depo., Vol. Ill,

Mr. Brian met with the birth mother in Utah and

her

preliminary

adoption by Plaintiffs.

commitment

to

[Finding No. 1]

place

her

child

for

Thereafter, the mother

traveled to Texas where she remained until the baby was born.
[Finding No. 2]

-427374 .NI211.8500

The child was born on June 25, 1986, in Texas.
No. 2]

[Finding

On June 27, 1986, the child and mother returned to the

State of Utah and the baby was delivered to Plaintiffs.
No. 2]

[Finding

Since that datef the child has never been out of the

custody, care and control of Plaintiffs.

[Finding No. 3]

In December 1986, a petition for adoption by Plaintiffs
was filed by Defendants as attorneys for Plaintiffs.
No. 5]

[Finding

Following Defendant Brian's appointment as a Judge of the

Third Judicial District Court of Utah in May 1987, Nielsen & Senior
continued to seek entry of a final decree of adoption.

[Finding

No.

mother's

6]

Defendants' efforts

to

obtain

the

natural

statutory consent were evaded by the natural mother.

On June 23,

1987, the birth mother informed Nielsen & Senior that she would not
give her consent to the adoption and wished to regain custody of
the child.

[Finding No. 7]

When Plaintiffs were immediately informed of the birth
mother's intentionf

they discharged Nielsen & Senior and hired

another attorney, who thereafter represented them in the adoption
proceedings.

[Finding No. 8]

Between July lf

1987f

and mid-

October 1987, Plaintiffs' attorney negotiated with the birth mother
and agreed to pay her approximately $10,000.00 for her alleged
expenses incurredf

including attorney's fees.

then executed her formal consent to the adoption.

The birth mother
[Finding No. 9]

On October 16, 1987, the decree of adoption was entered by the
court

and the adoption by Plaintiffs was complete.

No. 10]
-527374 .NI211.8500

[Finding

In November 1987f Plaintiffs' attorneyf Mark F. Robinson,
contacted Defendants regarding Plaintiffs' claims for expenses
allegedly

incurred

[Finding No. 11]

by

Plaintiffs

in

finalizing

the

adoption.

Alsof Plaintiffs personally wrote separately to

Mr. Brian and Nielsen & Senior, demanding damages for the alleged
improper handling of the adoption.

[James Johnson Depo., Vol. VI,

Exh. 13; R.961]
Thereafter, Plaintiffs retained the law firm of Howard,
Lewis & Petersen of Provo to represent them.

In August 1988,

D. David Lambert contacted Defendants to assert Plaintiffs' claims
regarding the adoption.

[Finding No. 12]

Defendants met with Mr.

Lambert to discuss possible resolution, but no resolution was
reached.

[Finding No. 12] In February 1989, Plaintiffs terminated

Mr. Lambert's representation.

[Finding No. 12; see also James

Johnson Depo., Vol. VI, Exh. 14]
After Mr. Lambert's termination, Plaintiffs met with
Defendants in further negotiations.
demands increased.

[Finding No. 13] Plaintiffs'

Plaintiffs attempted to involve LDS Church

officials and the news media in publicizing their claims.

[Finding

No. 13] During this period, Plaintiffs vacillated in claiming that
they

were

acting

[Finding No. 13]

pro

se

or

that

they

had

retained

counsel.

Among other activities, they contacted the news

media, circulated papers and materials among many lawyers —
in and without the state —

both

and aired their grievances through the

newspapers and over television, using the alias of "Johnson," and
filed a complaint with the State Bar.
-627374.N1211.8500

[James Johnson Depo.,

pp. 12, 15-38]

Mr. Brad England, an attorney

in Salt Lakef

reviewed the documents they sent him and "qualified" himself to
represent Plaintiffs, but Mr. Johnson did not "feel comfortable
about where

he was

Defendant Nielsen

(he off iced

in the

same building

as did

& Senior) and what his connection was with

Nielsen & Senior."

[James Johnson Depo., p. 16]

Mr. Johnson

further testified that law firms in Las Vegas and Arizona indicated
that they would represent him.

2.

[James Johnson Depo., p. 16]

The Lawsuit.
On

complaint,

June
pro

22,

se.

1990, Plaintiffs
The

complaint

filed

asserted

their

original

claims

against

Defendants for breach of contract, negligence, violation of child
placement laws, breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing,
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
R.12]

Plaintiffs

[Finding No. 14]

claimed

damages

in

an

[Finding No. 14;

undisclosed

amount.

On July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed their first

amended complaint, which generally alleged the same claims for
relief.

[Finding No. 15; R.26]

Plaintiffs

also

sought and

obtained permission to proceed under the "assumed names" of James
and Jennifer Johnson.

[R.85]

D. Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas attorney, was among those
sought

out by Plaintiffs.

[Finding No.

17]

In July 1990,

Mr. Waite wrote to Defendants, claiming to represent Plaintiffs and
demanding payment of $180,000.00. Mr. Waite further expressed his
-727374.NI211.8500

"anticipation"

that

the

media

attention

already

increase due to Judge Brian's judicial position.

given

would

[Finding No. 17]

Once again, Defendants rejected the claim. Plaintiffs later stated
that Mr. Waite was not going to represent them.

[Finding No. 17]

On July 30, 1990, Nielsen & Senior gave notice to take
Plaintiffs' depositions, beginning August
No. 18; R.91-90]

17, 1990.

[Finding

On August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled

depositions, Jerold D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of Conder &
Wangsgard appeared as counsel for Plaintiffs.

They requested that

the depositions be postponed until they could become familiar with
the case.

[Finding No. 18]
On September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard filed a second

amended complaint, alleging professional malpractice, breach of
contract, intentional

infliction of emotional distress

(as to

Defendant Brian only), negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and negligent misrepresentation.
filed their answers.

[Finding No. 19] Defendants then

[R.237, R.250, R.266]

Plaintiff James Johnson finally submitted to have his
deposition taken, commencing November 28, 1990 (more than three
months after it was originally scheduled).

[Finding No. 20]

The

deposition continued for three days, (with frequent interruptions
to allow Plaintiff to confer with his attorney), at which time
disagreement

developed

between

Plaintiffs

and

their

counsel

involving the testimony being given by Plaintiff James Johnson.
[Finding No. 20; James Johnson Depo., Vol. Ill, pp. 580-581]

The

deposition was adjourned on November 30th by Plaintiffs' attorney
-827374.NI211.8500

when Mr. Johnson claimed he did not "feel very good right now."
[Finding

No. 20; James

Johnson

Depo., Vol. Ill, pp.

582-585]

Later, Plaintiffs' attorney claimed Mr. Johnson was unable to
continue

his

deposition

for

mental

health

reasons.

[Letter

(R.276-277)]
In January 1991, Conder & Wangsgard withdrew as counsel
for Plaintiffs.

[R.284]

On January 18, 1991, Defendant Nielsen

& Senior gave notice to appoint counsel or to appear in person.
[Finding No. 21; R.282]

Plaintiffs did neither.

In March 1991, attorney David R. Irvine wrote to Nielsen
&

Senior,

suggesting

Plaintiffs.
telephone.
R.1995]

A

his

possible

possibility

of

appearance

settlement

as

was

counsel

for

discussed

by

[Finding No. 22; Whyte Affidavit, pp. 4-5; Ad. E;
Notwithstanding

his

letter

and

the

preliminary

discussions, Mr. Irvine never entered an appearance for Plaintiffs.
[Finding No. 22]
In April 1991, attorney Darwin C. Fisher entered his
appearance for Plaintiffs —
conference

on April

the day before the court's scheduling

16, 1991.

[Finding No. 23; R.867]

The

conference was continued at Mr. Fisher's request [Finding No. 23],
and was rescheduled by the court for June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah.
[Finding No. 24; R.871]

Again, the hearing was continued

July 1, 1991 [R.884], and was finally held on July 12, 1991.

to
The

court found that Mr. Fisher was not ready at the hearing to engage
in any meaningful discussion of a resolution of the case due to his

-927374.NI211.8500

lack of familiarity with the case.

[Finding No. 24; see also

Transcript of Hearing, July 12f 1991]
Also
November 1,

at

the

1991, to

July

12th

conference, the

designate

Plaintiffs'

Discovery cutoff was set for December

court

expert

30, 1991.

fixed

witnesses.
A pre-trial

conference was scheduled for January 24, 1992, and the trial was
rescheduled for February 17-28, 1992.

[Ad. K (Minute Entry R.898)]

The parties agreed, and the court ordered, that an agreed
pre-trial order be submitted prior to trial by January 13, 1992.
[Whyte Affidavit, p. 13; Ad. E; Finding No. 25; R.878, R.908]
Later, when Defendants prepared a proposed pre-trial order, their
repeated efforts to obtain the approval of Plaintiffs' attorneys
were unsuccessful.

[Finding No. 25; Whyte Affidavit, p. 13; Ad. E]

Plaintiffs never submitted a proposed pre-trial order to Defendants
or to the court.
From
attempted

[Finding No. 25]

December

1990 through

October

1991, Defendants

to resume Plaintiffs' depositions.

Plaintiff

James

Johnson did not submit himself to continue his deposition until
October 10, 1991, almost a year after it had begun.
No. 26]
health,

In addition to the prior excuse of Plaintiffs' poor
Mr.

Fisher

claimed

that

he was

familiar with the facts of the case.
Affidavit,

pp. 6-8;

Ad.

E]

The

completed on October 11, 1991.

still

insufficiently

[Finding No. 26; Whyte

deposition

examination

was

[Finding No. 26; James Johnson

Depo., Vols. IV and V]

-1027374 .N1211.8500

[Finding

In January 1992, Pat Brian was allowed to and filed a
counterclaim against Plaintiffs for defamation.
Counterclaim (R.1484)]
February

[Finding No. 28;

Upon Plaintiffs' motion, the trial set for

18, 1992, was continued to May 5-14, 1992.

[Finding

No. 28; R.1506]
Upon entry by the court of an order granting Defendants'
partial

summary

judgment

dismissing

the

cause

of

action

for

negligent infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiffs moved for a
new trial and for extension of the discovery period.

[R.1460]

On March 18, 1992, the court denied Plaintiffs' motion
for a new trial, but extended the date for discovery up to fourteen
days prior to the May 5th trial date.

[R.1623]

Following this

order, in a telephone conference with the court, Plaintiffs again
moved to extend the discovery cut-off.
to May 1, 1992 —

The extension was granted

three days before trial.

[Ad. I; R.1687]

On April 3, 1992, Plaintiffs petitioned for interlocutory
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the partial summary judgment
entered by the trial court
[R.1645-1630]
[R.1647]

on January

7 and March

18, 1992.

The trial court continued the trial without date.

The Utah Supreme Court denied interlocutory appeal on

May 21, 1992. Notice of denial was given to Plaintiffs' attorney.
[Ad. D]
On April 30, 1992, Plaintiffs sought permission to depose
Defendants' expert witness after the May 1st discovery cut-off.
[R.1657]

On

May

5,

1992, Plaintiffs

discovery, claiming discovery delays.
-1127374.NI211.8500

again

moved

[Ad. J; R.1666]

to

extend

On May 20, 1992, in response to Plaintiffs' motions for
additional timef the trial judge ruled that although discovery had
been a problem and extension after extension had been given, "the
court does not plan to deviate any further from the order that sets
discovery cut-off dates. No exception will be given."

[Memorandum

Decision, Ad. H; R.1713] The order to this effect was entered July
23, 1992.

[R.1718]
In

May

1992,

Plaintiffs

took

Defendants' expert witness, Brent Hoggan.

the

deposition

[Finding No. 39]

of
With

the court's permission, Defendants subpoenaed Lizanne Magleby (the
child's birth mother) for her deposition on June 30, 1992, and gave
due notice to Plaintiffs.

[Finding No. 37] Plaintiffs again moved

to postpone the deposition on the grounds that Plaintiffs' counsel
would be unable to attend [Finding No. 37], but the court ordered
that the deposition proceed.

[Finding No. 37; Order, 8/24/92;

R.1726]
During the June 1992 telephone hearing, the court also
ordered that the trial would be held on November 2-13, 1992.
[R.1983]

Judge Christoffersen instructed that this new trial date

be inserted in the "agreed" pre-trial order.

Plaintiffs did not

object to the new trial date.
The deposition of Ms. Magleby was taken by Defendants on
June 30, 1992, as
Plaintiffs

to

noticed.

advance

their

Thereafter, nothing
claims

[Finding No. 40]

-1227374 .NI211.8500

was

or to prepare

done

by

for trial.

Plaintiffs' attorney, Darwin C. Fisherf was to prepare
the pre-trial orderf to be agreed to by all parties.
Mr. Fisher failed to do so.

Howeverf

Plaintiffs did not do anything to

prepare a pre-trial order as the court had ordered in July 1991.
Defendants prepared and submitted to Plaintiffs' attorney several
drafts of a proposed pre-trial order.

Notwithstanding a prior

stipulation, Mr. Fisher refused to agree to any of the proposed
pre-trial orders and would not cooperate in preparing a stipulated
order.

[Stipulation, R.878; Finding No. 25; Whyte Affidavit, p.13]

3.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
On or about October 7, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher sought

leave to withdraw as Plaintiffs' attorney.

[R.1737]

Defendant

Brian opposed the motion, arguing that further delay prejudiced
him.

[Finding No. 41; R.1754]

The court allowed Mr. Fisher to

withdraw on November 19, 1992, observing that Plaintiffs' present
attorney,

Mr. Coxson,

October 26, 1992.

had

already

entered

his

appearance

[Finding No. 41; R.1780, 1756]

Plaintiffs' seventh attorney.

on

Mr. Coxson is

Of course, the November trial date

was also vacated.
Plaintiffs' new attorney failed to move the case toward
trial until after Defendants filed their Rule 41(b) motion to
dismiss

Plaintiffs'

February 3, 1993.

complaint

for

[Ad. G; R.1802]

lack

of

prosecution

on

No action had been taken by

Plaintiffs' attorney to move the matter to trial since May 1992.
In support

of the motion, Defendants
-13-
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filed their

memorandum,

recounting

the

continuances,

lengthy

delaysf

and

prosecution by Plaintiffs and their successive attorneys.

lack

of

[Ad. G;

R.1800]
Plaintiffs filed an opposing memorandum and moved to
"strike" the motion.
February

[Motion, R.1812-1813]. Contemporaneously, on

17, 1993, Plaintiffs

served Defendants with

numerous

requests for admissions which, the court later observed, violated
the ordered discovery cutoff, were duplicative, and evidenced a
total lack of familiarity with the case.

[Certificate of Service,

R.1805; Finding No. 45; Ad. C, R.1877]
When

Plaintiffs' counsel

attempted

to

continue

the

hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties agreed to argue the
motion by conference telephone call. That conference call was held
on March 11, 1993, with the court, Mr. Coxson, and Defendants'
attorneys present. All depositions were ordered published and made
available to the court.

[Ad. C, R.1877]

Following arguments by all counsel, Judge Christoffersen
outlined the factors in Westinahouse Elect. Supply Co., infra, and
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989) and reviewed the
history of the case.

[Ad. C, R.1877]

that Plaintiffs' conduct

The court then concluded

justified dismissal of the case with

prejudice, and granted Defendants' motion.
court

requested

Defendants'

to

prepare

[Ad. B; R.1879]
formal

findings

The
and

conclusions and judgment in conformity with the court's verbal
decision.

Defendants' counsel did so.

[Ad. B, C; R.1877, R.1879]

Plaintiffs' counsel likewise submitted their version of the court's
-1427374 .NI211.8500

findings of fact and conclusions of law which essentially parallel
the findings and conclusions entered by the court.

[Ad. F]

The

final dismissal and findings were entered April 6, 1993.
Plaintiffs'

motion

Plaintiffs filed this appeal.

for

new

trial

was

denied,

and

[Notice, R.2177]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Utah Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' petition for

interlocutory appeal in May 1992, long before Defendants' motion to
dismiss for lack of diligent prosecution was filed in February
1993.

The

Plaintiffs'

trial

court

complaint

for

clearly
lack

had
of

jurisdiction

diligent

to

dismiss

prosecution

when

Plaintiffs did virtually nothing from the time the Utah Supreme
Court denied interlocutory appeal in May 1992 until February 1993.
Plaintiffs

never

previously

challenged

the

trial

court's

jurisdiction in their objections, motion to strikef nor motion for
new trial.

We submit that Plaintiffs' contention now that the

court lacked jurisdictionf notwithstanding the clear record to the
contrary, raises substantial question as to Plaintiffs' knowledge
of this case, the frivolous nature of this appeal, and counsel's
obligations to this Court under Utah R. App. P. 40(a).
2.
discretion

The trial court
when

it

properly

considered

the

exercised

its

appropriate

considerable

factors

under

Westinghouse Elect. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors, Inc.,
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975), and Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237
(Utah App. 1989), namely:
-1527374 .NI211.8500

a.

Plaintiffs delayed and prolonged prosecution of the

case through regular replacement of counsel, continual attempts to
extend cut-off and deadline dates, expand discovery beyond the
issues, introduce irrelevant issues, and evidence an intention to
further delay the prosecution of the case.
b.

While Defendants continually

advanced

the case

forward to trial, Plaintiffs failed to move their case forward.
Plaintiffs have obstructed Defendants' and the court's efforts in
virtually every instance.
c.

Although all parties have been prejudiced by the

delays, the fault has been that of Plaintiffs' in every instance,
as found by the court in detail.
d.

Plaintiffs have not suffered any injustice.

The

only proper claim was for alleged negligent delay in obtaining an
adoption decree, yet Plaintiffs have not suffered any damage nor
increased monetary cost by virtue of any such delay.
e.

Plaintiffs have delayed resolution of their claims

until more than five and one-half years after the claims were first
made, two and one-half years after the complaint was filed, and
after four continued trial dates.

Plaintiffs have failed to

marshal the evidence before the court as to the proceedings herein,
hearings, the verbal representations to the court by Plaintiffs'
counsel, and the documents filed herein.

Instead of showing that

there is nothing in the record to support the trial court's
exercise of discretion, Plaintiffs' argument relies on the self-
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serving

affidavit

of

former

counsel

who

seeks

to

shift

responsibility onto others.
3.

The issue of emotional distress damages is not properly

before the Court because the affirmance of the trial court's
dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint is dispositive of all issues in
the

case.

When

the

trial

court

exercised

its

considerable

discretion to dismiss the case in light of Plaintiffs' dilatory
conduct, all prior interlocutory
rendered moot.

decisions by the court were

Because the final dismissal was not an abuse of

discretion, this Court need not even consider whether or not the
earlier partial summary judgment was proper.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO DISMISS THE CASE
Plaintiffs' claim that

"[n]o response

to the Motion

for

Interlocutory Order was ever entered by the Utah Supreme Court in
this matter prior to the dismissal of this case with prejudice" is
totally incorrect. On May 21, 1992, the Utah Supreme Court entered
an order denying Plaintiffs' petition, which stated:

"THIS DAY,

Petition

heretofore

for

considered,

interlocutory

and

the

Court

appeal
being

having

sufficiently

been

advised

in

the

premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the
same is, denied."

[Ad. D]

Plaintiffs were well aware of this fact.

Indeed, Finding

No. 32 of their findings of fact submitted to the court on April 2,
-1727374.NI211.8500

1993f states:

"The Utah Supreme Court denied plaintiff's Petition

for Interlocutory Appeal on May 21, 1992."

[R.1891]

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO U.R.CIV.P. 41(b) WAS PROPERLY
WITHIN THE COURT'S DISCRETION AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
A.

The Findings of Fact Should be Affirmed Because Plaintiffs
Fail to Marshal on Appeal the Facts Which Support the
Findings.
On appeal, a trial court's findings of fact will not be

disturbed

unless

they

are

clearly

erroneous.

"An

appellant

challenging the factual findings faces a substantial burden.

The

trial court's findings of fact will be affirmed if they are 'based
on sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court's construction.'"

Slatterv v. Covey

& Co., 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993), citing West Valley City
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991).
The party seeking to overturn the trial court's findings has
the burden of marshaling the evidence in support of the findings
and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, the findings
are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.

Slatterv, at 246;

Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 620-21 (Utah App. 1993); Hagan v.
Haqan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d
465, 468 (Utah App. 1989); West Valley City, at 1313.
In the Walton case, the court held:

"If the appellant fails

to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the
-1827374 .NI211.8500

record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a
review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and
the application of that law in the case."

Id., at 620-21.

In the instant appealf Plaintiffs have neither marshaled the
evidence

which

supports

the

trial

court's

findings,

demonstrated that such findings are clearly erroneous.

nor

Instead,

they have merely selected facts most favorable to their case,
rearguing those facts to this Court on appeal. Because Plaintiffs
have failed to satisfy their burden to marshal the evidence, this
Court must assume the correctness of and accept the trial court's
findings of fact, and proceed to a "review of the accuracy of lower
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the
case."

Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d at 606 (Utah App.

1993) .

B.

Based on Facts in the Record, the Trial Court's Dismissal of
Plaintiffs' Complaint was not an Abuse of Discretion.
Not only do Plaintiffs have the burden of marshaling the

evidence, but also to show that the dismissal of their case was an
abuse of discretion by the lower court.
Rule 41(b) empowers this Court to dismiss an action, with
prejudice and on the merits, for failure of the Plaintiff to
prosecute.

"The burden is upon the Plaintiff to prosecute a case

in due course without unusual or unreasonable delay."

Charlie

Brown Const. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370
(Utah App. 1987) (quoting Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity
-1927374.NI211.8500

Mutual

Irrigation

Co.,

698

P.2d

1340,

1344

(Colo.

1985)).

Plaintiffs must "prosecute their claims with due diligence, or
accept the penalty of dismissal."

Charlie Brown Const., at 1370,

(quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975)).
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the broad
discretion of the trial court.

Id.

This Court has held that it

will not interfere with the trial court's decision unless it
clearly appears that the Court has abused its discretion and that
there is a likelihood that injustice resulted.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court provided the trial courts with guidance
on Rule 41(b) dismissal in Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W.
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).

In that

case, the Court reviewed a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to
prosecute

and

identified

the

factors

to

be

considered

in

determining whether such a dismissal is appropriate. Those factors
were articulated recently by the Court of Appeals as follows:
The Westinghouse court delineated five factors in
addition to the length of time elapsed to determine the
propriety of a dismissal for failure to prosecute: (1)
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each
party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to
the other side; and (5) "most important, whether
injustice may result from the dismissal."
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219
(Utah App. 1991).

-2027374.NI2ll.8500

1.

The Facts of
Westinghouse.

this

Case

Warrant

Dismissal

Under

In determining whether to grant Defendants' motion to
dismiss in this case, the trial court applied the Westinghouse
factors to the established facts in the record, as follows:
a.

With respect to Factor (1), lapse of time, the trial

court determined that a considerable lapse of time occurred in this
case, almost five and one-half (5 1/2) years since the claims were
first made by Plaintiffs against Defendants, and over two and onehalf (2 1/2) years between the filing of the original complaint and
the 41(b) motion.

While this was not the deciding factor in the

court's analysis, it was of significance to the court.
b.
the

trial

With respect to Factor (2), conduct of the parties,
court

concluded

that

Defendants

consistently

and

continuously attempted to move the case forward through conducting
discovery, narrowing of the scope of the case through pre-trial
motions, and cooperating with the court and opposing counsel in
adherence to court cut-off dates and deadlines.

In contrast,

Plaintiffs persisted in delaying and prolonging the prosecution of
the case through the replacement of counsel, requiring re-education
of

new

counsel

in

each

instance,

and

through

continual

and

persistent attempts to extend cut-off dates and deadlines, to
expand the scope of discovery and to introduce new issues into the
case.

Weighing the conduct of the parties, the court concluded

that this factor weighed heavily in favor of Defendants.

-2127374.NI211.8500

c.& d.

With respect to Factors (3) and (4), opportunity

to move the case forward and actions of the parties to do so, the
trial court determined that all parties in this case had equal
opportunity to move the case forward to trial.

For the same

reasons as stated in subparagraph (b) above, the court concluded
that Defendants took advantage of their opportunity to move the
case forward.

In contrast, and in the face of their primary burden

to do so, Plaintiffs failed to move the case forward to trial and,
rather, obstructed Defendants' and the court's efforts to do so in
virtually every instance.

During the period of time that the

instant case was pending before the lower court, Plaintiffs had a
personal injury action pending in which they had other counsel
involving an automobile accident, which Plaintiff James Johnson
claimed caused him serious emotional distress. That case was tried
to a jury in April 1992.

A verdict of no cause of action was

appealed and transferred to this Court on October 5, 1992 (Case No.
920694).

The same attorney who ultimately withdrew in this case

represented Plaintiffs in the trial and was replaced by Plaintiffs'
present attorney on September 14, 1992.

Weighing the opportunity

to move the case forward and the actions of the parties in doing
so, the court properly determined that this factor weighed heavily
in favor of Defendants.
e.

With respect to Factor (5) , difficulty and prejudice

of the parties, the court stated that both sides of this case have
been prejudiced by the failure to move this case toward trial. The
court concluded, however, that the fault for the difficulty and
-2227374.Nnil.8500

prejudice suffered by the parties is Plaintiffs' in every instance.
Plaintiffs' actions in the constant replacement of counsel, and
attempts to delay and broaden the scope of discovery and issues in
the case up to the time the motion to dismiss was filed are
responsible
parties.

for the difficulty

and prejudice

suffered

by the

Weighing the difficulty and prejudice to the parties and

to the court, the court concluded that this factor weighed heavily
in favor of Defendants.
f.

With respect to Factor

(6), injustice which may

result from dismissal, the court concluded that no substantial
injustice would result to the Plaintiffs in this case.

The issue

remaining to be litigated was the claimed negligence and/or breach
of contract by Defendants in connection with the delayed adoption
by Plaintiffs of the minor child.

The child has never been out of

Plaintiffs' custody, and the adoption was finalized within three
and one-half (3 1/2) months of the making of the original claim by
the natural mother to obtain custody.

Only minor monetary costs

could have been incurred by Plaintiffs with new counsel to finalize
the adoption.

Even these amounts are disputed by Defendants as

having been unnecessarily incurred, since Nielsen & Senior could
have completed the adoption.

The court further determined that

Plaintiffs' conduct was the cause of the delay, difficulty and
prejudice suffered in this case, and that no substantial injustice
would

result

from

the

dismissal

prejudice.
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of

Plaintiffs'

claims

with

In light of the abovef the trial court properly concluded
that dismissal was not an abuse of its discretion.

Plaintiffsr conduct has repeatedly delayed the movement
of this matter to trial while
Defendants
have
consistently moved the case forward.

2.

As the facts clearly illustrate, Plaintiffs failed to
move the case forward.
successive

attorneys

resulting in delay.

in

Plaintiffs were represented by several
this

matter,

the withdrawal

Johnson's

finally

deposition

completed

each

Plaintiffs amended their complaint twice, and

three times requested a continuance of a trial setting.
James

of

more

was

than

rescheduled

a year

after

several
noticed.

Plaintiff
times

and

Although

Plaintiffs claim his deposition delay was due to his emotional
distress,

he

"physician"

was
who

psychologist —

never
is

treated

referred

to

by
in

a

medical

Plaintiffs'

doctor.
brief

The
is

a

the same person who allegedly treated him in his

personal injury case and testified at the trial of that matter.
Mr. Johnson's deposition in this case was recessed at the request
of

his

then

attorney

because

of

statements, which were particularly

Plaintiff's

inconsistent

noted by his attorney, as

follows:
Mr. [Johnson], I need to instruct you that Counsel is
asking questions; you're under oath to answer those
questions, and you need to answer those questions to the
best of your ability. As I have told you both on and off
the record, if you're unable to answer a question for
whatever reason, whether it's your own emotional state of
mind, your physical condition and your stamina, whatever
it might be, pure lapse of memory; I'm asking you to
-2427374.NI211.8500

state that and state
answering questions.

that

on

the

record

prior

to

We're not accomplishing anything here for any of us
— at least for our side of the lawsuit, I should say —
when you attempt to give an answer and then later your
recollection becomes better or worse.
[James Johnson Depo., p 581]
In April 1992, Plaintiffs filed with the Utah Supreme
Court a petition for interlocutory appeal which required that the
trial setting for May 1992 be stricken.
denied

and

Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs
did

not

were

take

Although the petition was

free to proceed
the

necessary

with

steps

their

toward

case,
trial,

specifically to submit a pretrial order as directed by the court or
to confirm the trial date.

Plaintiffs took no action at all after

May 1992 until Defendants' motion to dismiss was filed, and then
acted

only by way of filing

lengthy requests

for admissions,

evidencing an intent to revive discovery and enlarge the issues to
be tried.
Even

this

abbreviated

listing

of

facts

demonstrates

Plaintiffs' lack of determination to move the case forward to
trial.

Defendants, however, proceeded with the case, pursuing

discovery,

narrowing

the

issues

for

trial

by

motion,

and

consistently representing to the court their readiness for trial.
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Plaintiffs7 failure to prosecute the case with diligence
caused difficulty and prejudice to Defendants.

3.

Plaintiffs' numerous changes of counsel, amendments to
pleadings,

reluctant

compliance

with

Defendants'

discovery

requests, and requests for continuance of the trial date greatly
increased Defendants' burden of defending this action.

Defendants

were deprived of the benefits of a prompt resolution of the claims
against them.

Delay promised to make the presentation of evidence

at trial more difficult, prejudicing Defendants, whose defenses
required the accurate testimony of third parties whose recollection
would be clouded or who might become unavailable with the passage
of time.

Obviously, delay unnecessarily increased the cost of

defense.
Defendants lived more than five and one-half years with
Plaintiffs' threats and harassment.

Defendants were prepared to

respond to Plaintiffs' claims on the merits, but Plaintiffs delayed
every effort to place the matter before the court.

4.

Dismissal will not result in injustice to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs must diligently prosecute their claims or

accept the penalty of dismissal.
at 1370.

Charlie Brown Const., 740 P.2d

Such dismissal is not unjust when it is Plaintiffs'

conduct that invites or avoids dismissal.

Plaintiffs in this case

showed lack of diligence in getting their claims resolved on the
merits.

Presumably, they were aware of the consequences of their

lack of diligence.
-2627374.NI211.8500

Defendants acknowledge that this Court must "balance the
need

to

expedite

litigation

and

efficiently

utilize

judicial

resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in
court."

Meadow Fresh Farms, 813 P.2d at 1219.

Notwithstanding,

when the facts of this matter are evaluated against the factors set
forth in Westinghouse. dismissal was clearly in order.

C.

Dismissal of this Case Was Consistent with Prior Decisions of
Utah Courts.
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989), the

Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of Maxfield's
complaint for lack of prosecution.
Court were these:

The facts considered by this

The plaintiff filed his complaint in 1980 and

amended it twice, each time adding new theories of the case.
at 238-239.
and

Id.,

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times

filed a petition

for interlocutory

court's refusal to grant it.

appeal from the trial

The petition was denied by the

Supreme Court.

Two of the plaintiff's attorneys withdrew from

representation.

The plaintiff objected to all three of the trial

dates set. When the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint a third
time and, at the same timef his third attorney moved to withdraw,
the trial court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute the
action in a timely manner.

Id., at 239.

This Court reviewed the facts in light of the Westinghouse
factors, stating that "there is more to consider in determining if
a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper than merely the
-2727374 .NI211.8500

amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed."

Maxfield v.

Rushton, at 237 (quoting Westinqhouse Elec. Supply Co.. 544 P.2d at
879).

With regard to the issue of injustice, this Court held:
[W]hile we recognize that injustice could result
from dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose
whatever interest he may have in the disputed property
without having the opportunity to argue his case on its
merits, we conclude that he had more than ample
opportunity to prove his asserted interest and simply
failed to do so. Such nonaction is inexcusable, not only
from the standpoint of the parties, but also because it
constitutes abuse of the judicial process.

Id. , at 240-241.

It is apparent that the Court did not equate the

activity in the case with timely prosecution.
The

special

concurrence

of

pertinent to the case at hand.

Judge

Orme

is

particularly

The concurring opinion identified

the following conduct of the plaintiff as determinative:
Maxfield's latest counsel's motion for leave to withdraw
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another
amended
complaint
constituted,
taken together, a
concession by Maxfield that he was nowhere near being
ready to try his case in the matter for a few days even
though the action had been pending for the better part of
a decade. It is the length of time this action had been
pending, coupled with Maxfield's obvious unreadiness that
makes sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this case.
Id., at 241.
In this

case, Plaintiffs

began

a course

of

threats

and

harassment toward Defendants nearly five and one-half years prior
to dismissal.

Defendants received increasing demands for payment

by Plaintiffs or by counsel on their behalf for nearly three years
(in spite of Defendants' efforts to resolve the matter) before the
original complaint was filed.

The action was pending for two and

one-half years, during which time Defendants prepared for trial.
-2827374 .NI211.8500

Plaintiffs did not prepare for trial, but pressed Defendants with
their demands for ever-increasing amounts of damages. Defendants
are entitled to an end to threats by resolution of this matter.
The courts are also entitled to relief.

As in Maxfield v.

Rushton, supra, Plaintiffs' nonaction is inexcusable, not only from
Defendants' standpoint, but because it constitutes abuse of the
judicial process.

Dismissal, therefore, is consistent with the

precedents of the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The

Westinahouse

factors

remain

the

standard

governing

dismissal, whether the trial court dismisses, sua sponte, an action
for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 4-103, or upon motion,
pursuant to Rule 41(b).

Meadow Fresh Farms, at 1219.

As

Defendants have demonstrated above, an examination of the facts of
this case in light of those factors supports dismissal of this
action with prejudice and on the merits.

It was within the trial

court's discretion to grant Defendants' motion to dismiss, and
affirmance of the dismissal is appropriate under the case law and
just on the facts.

POINT III
NO CAUSES OF ACTION REMAIN FOR WHICH
PLAINTIFFS CAN RECOVER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES
As stated by this Court in Maxfield v. Rushton, supra, because
the dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint under Rule 41(b), U.R.Civ.P.
was proper, it is dispositive of the entire case and the alleged
error

of

the

court

relating
-29-
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to

other

matters

is

mdot.

Additionally, Plaintiffs' appeal

is inadequate to address the

issues which they now attempt to raise.

CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

hereinabove

stated,

the

dismissal

of

Plaintiffs' complaint by the lower court should be affirmed.
DATED this

of January, 1994.

Arthur H. Nielsen
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Tab A

Rule 41

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

ner, there was no abuse in the district court's
denial of plaintiffs second motion. Hill v.
Dickerson. 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Need.
Where the defendant's counsel had three
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the
witnesses, purportedly important to his case,
were actually present at trial and thus subject

100

to cross-examination, the purely speculative
need for a third witness did not entitle the defendant to the granting of a motion for continuance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109
(Utah 1985).
C i t e d in Thor,
y Thorl
57g R M
92?
(Utah 1978).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance
§ 1 et seq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83,
84.
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.;
88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35.
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent continuance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-

ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.
Ke
Y Numbers. — Continuance <s=> 1 et seq.;
Trial «» 1 to 7.

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion :s not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
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Defendants.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs• Complaint pursuant
to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P., came on for hearing before the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March
11, 1993. The hearing was conducted by telephone, pursuant to
stipulation of counsel for the respective parties and as
permitted by Rule 4-501(5), Code of Judicial Administration.
following appearances were entered:

The

Richard C. Coxson for

Plaintiffs; Arthur H. Nielsen, Larry L. Whyte and Marilynn P.
Fineshriber of Nielsen & Senior for Defendant Nielsen & Senior;
and Michael L. Dowdle for Defendant Pat B. Brian.

Chris L.

Schmutz did not appear in person or by counsel, the action having
previously been dismissed with prejudice as to him.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, motions, briefs
and other records and papers in this matter, having heard the
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
made its oral ruling on the matter on March 11, 1993. The Court,
having made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now
HEREBY ENTERS JUDGMENT that Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs* Complaint pursuant to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P. is
hereby granted and Plaintiffs' complaint and said action be, and
it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety with prejudice and on the
merits.
Costs are awarded to Defendants.

DATED this

3- day of

^Uh^Jy

1993.

BY THE COURT:

wr
Honorable VeNoy Chrirst(KfEersen

0/ST
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Defendants• Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs• Complaint pursuant
to Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P.f came on for hearing before the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen at 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, March
11, 1993. The hearing was conducted by telephone, pursuant to
stipulation of counsel for the respective parties and as
permitted by Rule 4-501(5), Code of Judicial Administration.
following appearances were entered:

The

Richard C. Coxson for

Plaintiffs; Arthur H. Nielsen, Larry L. Whyte and Marilynn P.
Fineshriber of Nielsen & Senior for Defendant Nielsen & Senior;
and Michael L. Dowdle for Defendant Pat B. Brian.

Chris L.

Schmutz did not appear in person or by counsel, the action having
previously been dismissed with prejudice as to him.
Prior to argument of Defendants* Motion, Defendant Nielsen &
Senior requested that all depositions in the case be published
and be available for use by any of the parties and for the
consideration of the Court.

Defendant Nielsen & Senior, further,

moved the Court to grant an Order that the matter should proceed
in the true names of the Plaintiffs which was agreed to by
Plaintiffs' counsel, at least for the present proceedings, and
said motion was granted.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings, motions, briefs
and other records and papers in this matter, having heard the
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now
makes and enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In January, 1986, Defendant Pat B. Brian
(a) was a member of the firm of Nielsen & Senior;
(b) was retained by Plaintiffs to represent them in
the adoption of a child to be born in June, 1986;
(c) met with the birth mother and obtained her
preliminary commitment to place her child for
adoption by the Plaintiffs.

2.

Following the birth of the child on June 25, 1986, in

Texas, the child was returned to the State of Utah and placed in
the custody of the Plaintiffs.
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3.

Since on or about June 27, 1986, when said child was

delivered to Plaintiffs, it has never been out of the custody,
care and control of the Plaintiffs.
4.

Defendant Brian claims to have discussed with the

Plaintiffs the birth mother's reluctance to relinquish her child
and the advisability of delaying the obtaining of her formal
consent to adoption.

Plaintiffs deny that this conversation took

place.
5.

On or about December 19, 1986, the Petition for

Adoption by Plaintiffs was filed by Defendant Nielsen & Senior.
6.

In approximately May, 1987, Defendant Brian was

appointed a judge of the Third Judicial District Court of Utah.
Defendant Nielsen & Senior continued to seek entry of a final
Decree of Adoption.
7.

On or about June 23, 1987, Defendant Nielsen & Senior

was informed by the birth mother that she would not give her
consent to the adoption and wished to regain custody of the
child.
8.

Plaintiffs were immediately informed of the birth

mother's intention and they sought other counsel who, thereafter,
represented them with regard to the adoption.
9.

Between July 1, 1987 and the middle of October, 1987,

there was considerable activity, including Court appearances and,
finally, negotiations which resulted in the birth mother being
paid approximately $10,000.00 for alleged expenses she claimed to
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have incurred, including attorney's fees, and the birth mother
executed her formal consent to the adoption.
10.

On October 16, 1987, the Decree of Adoption was entered

by the Court and the adoption was completed.
11.

In November, 1987, Plaintiffs, through their then

counsel, Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims
for several thousand dollars allegedly incurred by Plaintiffs in
finalizing the adoption at issue in this case.

Shortly

thereafter, Plaintiffs wrote a letter to Defendants Nielsen &
Senior and Pat Brian demanding they be paid damages for the
alleged improper handling of the adoption.
12.

In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of the law firm of

Howard, Lewis and Petersen in Provo, made contact with Defendants
to assert Plaintiffs* claims regarding the adoption.

At this

time, Plaintiffs were demanding payment of $47,000.00.
Defendants met with Mr. Lambert to discuss the possible
resolution of Plaintiffs' claims.

On February 17, 1989, Mr.

Lambert's representation of Plaintiffs was terminated by
Plaintiffs.
13.

Thereafter, direct contact was had with Plaintiffs by

Defendants and negotiations were conducted during which
Plaintiffs' demands increased and attempts were made by
Plaintiffs to involve LDS Church officials and the news media.
During this period, Plaintiffs also alternated in claiming that
they were representing themselves or that they had retained
counsel.
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14.

Finally, on June 22, 1990, Plaintiffs filed their

original complaint, pro se. The complaint contained claims
against one or more Defendants for breach of contract,
negligence, violation of child placement laws, breach of
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation,
intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
15.

Plaintiffs sought damages of an undisclosed amount.
On or about July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed their first

Amended Complaint, which generally contained the same claims for
relief.
16.

During the spring and summer of 1990, Plaintiffs

claimed to be searching for legal counsel to represent them
against Defendants.

Plaintiffs publicized the matter by

contacting scores of lawyers and law firms, sending out packets
of information which contained, among other things, their claims
against Defendant Brian then pending before the Utah State Bar.
17.

One of the attorneys contacted by Plaintiffs was D.

Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas, Nevada, attorney who claimed to
represent Plaintiffs in this matter.

On or about July 13, 1990,

he wrote Defendants a letter demanding payment of $180,000.00,
and expressed his anticipation that the media attention already
given to the case would increase due to Judge Brian's position.
Defendants responded, rejecting the claim and Plaintiffs later
stated that Mr. Waite was not going to represent them.
18.

Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint and on

or about July 30, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed the
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Plaintiffs1 depositions, to commence on August 17, 1990. On
August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled depositions, Jerold
D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm of Conder &
Wangsgard entered their appearance as counsel for Plaintiffs, and
requested that the depositions be postponed until counsel could
become familiar with the case.
19.

On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard

filed Plaintiffs* Second Amended Complaint, alleging professional
malpractice, breach of contract, intentional infliction of
emotional distress (as to Defendant Brian only), negligent
infliction of emotional distress and negligent misrepresentation.
20.

The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally began

on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was
originally scheduled.

The deposition lasted for three (3) days,

(with frequent interruptions) at which time disagreement
developed between Plaintiffs and their counsel involving the
testimony of Plaintiff.

The deposition was adjourned by

Plaintiffs' counsel, indicating that Mr. Johnson was ill.
21.

On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard

withdrew as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen &
Senior sent out a notice to appoint counsel or to appear in
person on January 18, 1991.
22.

On March 21, 1991, David R. Irvine wrote to Defendant

Nielsen & Senior, indicating that he had been contacted by and
anticipated entering his appearance as counsel of record for
Plaintiffs, and inquiring regarding a resolution of this matter
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by settlement.

Notwithstanding the letter and preliminary

discussions, Mr. Irvine did not enter an appearance for
Plaintiffs as counsel in the case.
23.

A scheduling conference was scheduled by the Court for

April 16, 1991. The conference was continued at the instance of
Darwin C. Fisher of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher, who entered an
appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991.
24.

A new scheduling and settlement conference was

scheduled by the Court for June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah.

This

conference was held, however, on July 12, 1991. At that time
Plaintiffs' counsel refused to engage in any meaningful
discussion as to resolution of the case due to his need to
familiarize himself with the case.
25.

Following the conference on July 12, 1991, a scheduling

order was entered by this Court on August 13, 1991, setting
discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation and
pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10,
1992.

The Order also required that a Pre-trial Order be

submitted on or before January 13, 1992. Defendants* repeated
efforts to obtain the stipulation of Plaintiffs' counsel to a
proposed Pre-Trial Order were unsuccessful.

Plaintiffs never

submitted a proposed Pre-trial Order to the Court.
26.

Notwithstanding Defendants1 numerous attempts to

complete Plaintiffs1 depositions, continuation of the deposition
of Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed until October 10, 1991
because Plaintiff refused to appear.
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The reasons given for the

delay were that Mr. Fisher was still insufficiently familiar with
facts of the case.

The deposition examination was finally

concluded on October 11, 1991, almost a year after it was begun.
27.

A hearing was held in St. George, Utah on December

6,

1991, regarding Defendants' motions to dismiss, or in the
alternative for summary judgment as to some of the causes of
action in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.

At the hearing,

also, the parties discussed resolution of the case. Mr. Fisher
requested delay of the trial set for February 3-10, 1992, until
later that month which was granted and the trial set for February
18, 1992. Various scheduling dates were again set.
28.

Pursuant to this Court's Order of January, 1992,

Defendant Pat B. Brian was granted leave to file a Counterclaim.
Upon motion of Plaintiffs1 counsel, the trial setting for
February 18-28, 1992, was stricken and the trial set for May 5
through 14, 1992.
29.

In February, 1992, this Court heard Defendants' motions

to dispose of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint and granted the same, narrowing the causes of
action in the case to professional negligence and breach of
contract.
30.

Subsequent to this hearing, in April, 1992, counsel for

Plaintiffs entreated the Court to strike the trial date set for
May on the basis that discovery was still necessary to complete
preparations for trial, that counsel could not be ready for the
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trial in so short a time, and that certain conflicts existed
which necessitated that the date be re-set.
31.

Although opposed by Defendants, the motion to strike

the trial date was granted by the Court.

A new trial date was

set for November 2-13, 1992, and the discovery cut-off date was
extended to May 1, 1992.
32.

In April, 1992, counsel for Plaintiffs filed with the

Utah Supreme Court a petition for permission to appeal from the
interlocutory order of the trial Court dismissing certain causes
of action in Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint.
33.

On April 7, 1992, this Court entered an order striking

the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without date.
34.

The Utah Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs1 petition

for interlocutory appeal on May 21, 1992.
35.

During discovery proceedings, Plaintiff gave notice of

taking the deposition of Lizanne Magleby.
Ms. Magleby did not appear.

On the date scheduled,

Counsel for all parties agreed that

Plaintiffs could reschedule the deposition.

Thereafter,

Plaintiffs* counsel met privately with Ms. Magleby, and then
cancelled Ms. Magleby*s deposition altogether.
36.

Thereafter, Defendants noticed the taking of the

deposition of Ms. Magleby, whereupon Plaintiffs refused to
cooperate in the taking of Ms. Magleby*s deposition.

Defendants

were required to obtain leave of the Court to depose Ms. Magleby
after the discovery cut-off, notwithstanding that it was
Plaintiff's dilatory conduct in scheduling, and then cancelling,
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the deposition which delayed the taking of the deposition by
Defendants.
37.

The deposition was set for June 30, 1992. Plaintiffs

moved, again, to delay on the grounds that their counsel would be
unable to attend.

The matter was argued to the court on June 25,

1992, and an Order entered that the deposition proceed as
scheduled.
38.

Plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery cut-off date

set by the Court for May 1, 1992. The Court denied Plaintiffs1
request and stated in its Memorandum Decision dated May 20, 1992,
that no exception would be permitted.
39.

Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case

forward since Plaintiffs took the deposition of Brent Hoggan in
May, 1992, approximately ten months ago.
40.

The deposition of Ms. Magleby, by Defendants, was the

last action on the case.
41.

On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for

leave to withdraw as Plaintiff's counsel. Defendant Brian
opposed the Motion, arguing that further delay would be
prejudicial to Defendants.

Nevertheless, Richard C. Coxson

entered an appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs on October 26,
1992.

Due to the appearance of Mr. Coxson, Mr. Fisher's Motion

was granted and the appearance of Mr. Coxson as counsel for
Plaintiffs was acknowledged by the Court on November 19, 1992.
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42.

Following the entry of his appearance in October, 1992,

Plaintiffs * counsel failed to take any action to move the case
toward trial until after Defendants moved for dismissal.
43.

The course of conduct of Plaintiffs since this dispute

arose has been directed toward proliferating the issues and to
avoid trial before the Court.
44.

The conduct of the Defendants has been directed toward

narrowing the issues and preparing the case for trial.
Defendants have not delayed or hindered the prosecution of this
case.
45.

Plaintiffs have failed to abide by the Court's orders

to move the case forward, most recently violating the Court's
Order for discovery cut-off, which Order of May 20, 1992,
specifically refused to extend discovery further.

Following

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failing to prosecute the case,
Plaintiffs on February 17, 1993 submitted a set of forty Requests
for Admission which were duplicative and evidenced a total lack
of familiarity with the issues in the case.
46.

During the nearly three years this case has been

pending, the Plaintiffs have violated the Court's Orders setting
the date by which discovery must be completed, repeatedly made
changes of counsel requiring the Court to educate counsel
regarding the facts and posture of the case, and, most recently,
have alluded to further amendment and broadening of the claims as
originally set forth by Plaintiffs' complaint.
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47.

Plaintiffs are now represented by their seventh

attorney and Plaintiffs' failure to maintain counsel has resulted
in prejudice to the Defendants.
48.

The issue remaining to be litigated in this matter is

the claimed negligence and/or breach of contract by Defendants in
connection with Plaintiffs' adoption of the minor child.
49.

Any damages suffered by Plaintiffs, which Defendants

dispute, would have been incurred during the three and one-half
months approximately from July 1, 1987 to October 15, 1987 when
the dispute over the adoption was settled.
50.

There is a dispute of facts as to whether those fees

and costs were necessarily incurred or whether Nielsen & Senior
could have finalized the adoption without the necessity of the
intervention of other counsel.
Having made its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Rule 41(b), U. R. Civ. P., empowers this Court to

dismiss an action, with prejudice and on the merits, for failure
of the Plaintiffs to prosecute.
2.

Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within

the broad discretion of the trial court.
3.

The single issue presently before the Court is whether

the Motion to Dismiss is sufficiently supported by the facts of
the case and any allegations of the Plaintiffs regarding contacts
with or by ecclesiastical authorities or with state and federal
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agencies are not relevant to Defendants1 Motion and will not be
considered by the Court.
4.

The factors to be considered in determining whether

dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate are set forth
in Westinqhouse Electrical Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) and restated by the
Utah Court of Appeals in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah
App. 1989).
5.

The Court has considered those factors in determining

whether to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as follows:
a.

With respect to Factor (1), the Lapse of Time, the

Court concludes that a considerable lapse of time has occurred in
this case, almost five and one-half (5 1/2) years since the
claims were first made by Plaintiffs against Defendants, and over
two and one-half (2 1/2) years since the filing of the original
complaint.

While this is not the deciding factor in the Court's

analysis, it is of significance to the Court•
b.

With respect to Factor (2), the Conduct of the Parties,

the Court concludes that Defendants have consistently and
continuously moved the case forward through conducting discovery,
narrowing of the scope of the case through pre-trial motions, and
cooperating with the Court and opposing counsel in adherence to
Court cut-off dates and deadlines.

In contrast, Plaintiffs have

persisted in delaying and prolonging the prosecution of the case
through the regular replacement of counsel, requiring reeducation of new counsel in each instance, and through continual
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and persistent attempts to extend cut-off dates and deadlines, to
expand the scope of discovery and to introduce new issues into
the case. Weighing the conduct of the parties, the Court
concludes that this factor weighs heavily in favor of Defendants.
c.

With respect to Factors (3) and (4), the Opportunity to

Move the Case Forward and the Actions of the Parties to Do So,
the Court concludes that all parties in this case have had equal
opportunity to move the case forward to trial. For the same
reasons as stated in subparagraph (b) above, the Court concludes
that Defendants have taken advantage of their opportunity to move
the case forward in every instance.

In contrast, and in the face

of their primary burden to do so, Plaintiffs have failed to move
the case forward to trial, and have, rather, obstructed
Defendants1 and the Court's efforts to do so in virtually every
instance.

Weighing the opportunity to move the case forward and

the actions of the parties in doing so, the Court concludes that
this factor weighs heavily in favor of Defendants.
d.

With respect to Factor (5), the Difficulty and

Prejudice of the Parties, the Court concludes that both sides of
this case have been prejudiced by the failure to move this case
toward trial. The Court has concluded, however, that the fault
for the difficulty and prejudice suffered by the parties is
Plaintiffs1 in every instance.

Plaintiffs1 actions in the

constant replacement of counsel, and attempts to delay and
broaden the scope of discovery and issues in the case are
entirely to blame for the difficulty and prejudice suffered by
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the parties. Weighing the difficulty and prejudice to the
parties, and to the Court, the Court concludes that this factor
weighs heavily in favor of Defendants.
e.

With respect to Factor (6), the Injustice Which May

Result from Dismissal, the Court concludes that no injustice will
result to the Plaintiffs in this case.

The issue remaining to be

litigated in this matter is the claimed negligence and/or breach
of contract by Defendants in connection with adoption by
Plaintiffs of the minor child.

The child has never been out of

Plaintiffs' custody, and the adoption was finalized within three
and one-half (3 1/2) months of the making of the original claim
by the natural mother to obtain custody.

The Court concludes

that only minor monetary costs could have been incurred by
Plaintiffs with new counsel to finalize the adoption.

Even these

amounts are disputed by Defendants as having been unnecessarily
incurred, since Nielsen & Senior could have completed the
adoption.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs1 conduct in this

case has been the cause of the delay, difficulty and prejudice
suffered in this case, and that no injustice will result from the
dismissal of Plaintiffs* claims with prejudice.
6.

Plaintiffs* conduct constitutes abuse of the judicial

process as set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah
App. 1989).
7.

Dismissal of Plaintiffs * case with prejudice and on the

merits is justified by Plaintiffs * dilatory conduct as set forth
in Hill v. Dickersonf 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992).
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8.

Following dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, the

Counterclaim of Defendant Brian should be dismissed also.
9.

All other outstanding motions before the Court,

specifically, Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions, Plaintiffs'
Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants'
Objections to Requests for Admissions, and Defendants' Motion for
Sanctions are, likewise, rendered moot.
10.

Defendants are entitled to their costs herein incurred.

DATED this £ —day of itoeh, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

'CjL

7/y

-t7-

V e N o y / C h r i s t o f fers^ej}7

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

/7

"

Richard C. Coxson
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Jl^tiay of March, 1993, I
have served Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment by causing a true and correct copy of the
same

to be sent, through the United States mails, first-class

postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard C. Coxson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660

^W(n^^
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114

May 21, 1992
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Michael L. Dowdle
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS
Attorneys at Law
215 South State, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

James A. Johnson and,
Jennifer L. Johnson,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Nielsen & Senior, a Utah
Corporation and Pat B. Brian,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 920170
900400460CN

THIS DAY, Petition for an interlocutory appeal having been
heretofore considered, and the Court being sufficiently advised in
the premises, it is ordered that an interlocutory appeal be, and the
same is, denied.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk
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4 " DISTRICT COURT
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
Marilyn P. Fineshriber (4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-1900
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L. WHYTE
Plaintiffs,
v.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
professional corporation, and
PAT B. BRIAN,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
LARRY L. WHYTE, being first duly sworn and upon oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of

Utah; am over the age of 18 years; and am competent to testify to
the matters contained herein.

M300.NI211.8500

2.

At all relevant times herein, I was one of the attorneys

who represented Defendant Nielsen & Senior in the above-referenced
action.
3.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein,

and if called, would competently testify as to the same.
4.

I have reviewed the Affidavit of Darwin C. Fisher, and

find the same to be factually incorrect, containing many false
statements and misrepresentations.

As a result, I hereby respond

to each and every paragraph of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit.
5.

In response to paragraph 3 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

Affiant denies that Mall continuances of Mr. Johnson's deposition
was [sic] at the request of Nielsen & Senior and Judge Brian."
Affiant sets forth the following information and history relating
to Defendants' numerous attempts to depose Plaintiffs:
a.

On July 30, 1992, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed

Plaintiffs' depositions for August 17, 1990.
b*

[See Record.]

On or about August 3, 1990, Plaintiffs objected to

their scheduled depositions and requested a continuance until
September 28, 1990, by filing an Ex Parte Motion for Enlargement of
Time and Order No. 2.
c.

[See Record.]

On August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled

depositions, Jerold D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm
of Conder & Wangsgard, entered their appearance as counsel for
Plaintiff's [see Record], and requested that the depositions be
postponed until counsel could become familiar with the case.
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d.

On September 19, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior

again noticed Plaintiffs* depositions for November 6, 1990.

[See

Record.]
e.

On October 26, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior

rescheduled Plaintiffs' depositions to November 28, 1990, at the
request of Plaintiffs' counsel, because of "scheduling conflicts."
[See Record.]
f.

The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally

began on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was
originally scheduled.

The deposition lasted for three (3) days,

with frequent interruptions. By the afternoon of the third day, a
disagreement
involving

developed

the

between

testimony

of

Plaintiffs

Plaintiff.

and
The

their

counsel

deposition

was

unilaterally adjourned by Plaintiffs' counsel, indicating that
Mr. Johnson was ill.
g.

[See Deposition Transcript.]

Thereafter, Defendant Nielsen & Senior attempted to

obtain new dates from Plaintiffs' counsel for resuming Plaintiff
James Johnson's deposition, without success.
h.

On December 11, 1990, Plaintiffs' counsel sent a

letter to Defendant Nielsen & Senior informing it that Plaintiff
James Johnson would be unavailable for the completion of his
deposition until sometime after January 1991.

The letter from

Plaintiffs ' counsel was accompanied by a letter from a psychologist
who claimed that Plaintiff James Johnson's depression, stress and
anxiety prevented him
earlier.

from appearing

(A copy of the December 11, 1990, letter, accompanied by
-3-
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for his deposition any

the December 7, 1990, letter from Ralph W. Gant, are attached
hereto as Exhibit 1.)
i.

On January 9, 1991, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a

motion to extend (for an indefinite period) the time in which
Plaintiff James Johnson was to examine and correct the partial
deposition (which had been transcribed), again alleging that this
extension of time was necessary due to the stress and depression
which Plaintiff James Johnson was allegedly suffering from.

[See

Record•]
j.

On February 21, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior,

because of the difficulties it had already experience in scheduling
and completing the deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson, filed a
motion for a scheduling and discovery conference.
k.
also

noticed

On February 21, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior
the

continuation

deposition for March 5, 1991.
1«

[See Record.]

of

Plaintiff

James

Johnson's

[See Record.]

Late in the afternoon on March 4, 1991, Plaintiff

James Johnson presented himself at the office of Defendant Nielsen
& Senior, and in a meeting with Affiant, informed Affiant that he
was leaving on vacation with his wife and children to Las Vegas,
Nevada, and would not be present for his deposition the following
morning, March 5, 1991.

Plaintiffs did not appear for their

scheduled depositions on March 5, 1991.
m.

Thereafter, attorney David R. Irvine, on behalf of

Plaintiffs, contacted Defendant Nielsen & Senior and reached an
agreement with Arthur Nielsen, wherein Defendant Nielsen & Senior
-420^00.NI211.8500

would refrain from taking any further action in this matter for a
short

period

of

time, pending

finalization

agreement for representation of Plaintiffs.

of Mr.

Irvine's

This agreement was

confirmed in a letter from Affiant to Michael L. Dowdle dated
March 12, 1991.

(A copy of the letter is attached hereto as

Exhibit 2.)
n.

Thereafter/ Defendant Nielsen & Senior received no

communication or word from David R. Irvine and therefore, on
March 20/ 1991# Defendant Nielsen & Senior again re-noticed the
continuation of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition for March 28,
1991/ providing a complimentary copy to David R. Irvinef along with
a cover letter.

(A copy of the March 20f 199lf letter is attached

hereto as Exhibit 3.)
o.

On

March

21/

1991/

Plaintiff

James

Johnson's

psychologist/ Ralph W. Gant# wrote a letter to the Honorable VeNoy
Christoffersen/ stating/ in substancef that Plaintiff Johnson's
condition (stress and depression) prevented him from continuing
with

his

deposition

on

March

28/

1991/

Mr. Johnson's deposition be postponed.
1991/

and requested

that

(A copy of the March 21,

letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.)
p.

On March 26, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior

received a letter from Plaintiffs requesting that Plaintiffs'
depositions scheduled for March 28, 1991/ be continued without
date.

(A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 5.)
q.

Plaintiffs

did

not

depositions on March 28/ 1991.
-520300.NI211.8500

appear

for their

scheduled

r.

On April 4, 1991, the Court sent out notice of a

scheduling conference for April 16, 1991.
s.

[See Record.]

On April 9, 1991, Plaintiffs filed a notice of

objection to the scheduling conference scheduled for April 16,
1991.

[See Record.]
t.

The scheduling conference was continued

at the

request of Darwin C. Fisher, who entered an appearance on behalf of
Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991.
u.

On April 17, 1991, the Court sent another notice of

a settlement conference for June 26, 1991.
v.

[See Record.]

On June 20, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior again

noticed the continuation of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition
for July 8, 1991.
w.

[See Record.]

Shortly

thereafter,

Darwin C. Fisher

contacted

Affiant and indicated that he would be unable to attend the
scheduling conference on June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah, and
requested that the date again be rescheduled, causing yet another
delay.
x.

The

settlement

June 26, 1991, to July

conference

8, 1991.

was

continued

from

However, on July 5, 1991,

Darwin C. Fisher contacted Affiant and indicated that Plaintiff
James Johnson would be unable to attend his deposition scheduled
for July 8, 1991, and requested that it be postponed.

Mr. Fisher

also stated that his client's deposition should not be taken prior
to the scheduling conference scheduled for July 12, 1991.
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(See

copy of Affiant's letter confirming said action, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit 6•)
y.

On August

21, 1991, Affiant wrote a letter to

Darwin C. Fisher, informing Mr. Fisher, among other things, that
Plaintiff James Johnson had unilaterally terminated his deposition
the prior November,

stating

that

Defendants were anxious to

complete Mr. Johnson's deposition, and requesting confirmation that
Mr. Johnson was sufficiently well to continue with his deposition.
(A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.)
z.

On September 5, 1991, Defendant Nielsen & Senior

Dnce again noticed the continuation of the deposition of Plaintiff
James Johnson for October 7, 1991.
aa.

[See Record.]

Notwithstanding Defendants' numerous attempts to

:omplete Plaintiffs* depositions, continuation of the deposition of
Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed because Plaintiffs refused to
ippear

until

October

10,

1991.

Mr.

Johnson's

deposition

examination was finally concluded on October 11, 1991, almost one
'ear after it was begun.
ab.

All of the delays occasioned with the taking and

ompletion of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition are documented
nd, without exception, were caused because of Plaintiff's failure
nd refusal to appear.

None of the delays in the taking and

ompletion of Plaintiffs' depositions were attributable to any of
he Defendants.
6«

In response to paragraph 4 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

ffiant denies that Defendants

"requested continuances for the
-7-
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taking of Mr, Johnson's Deposition, M for the reasons set forth in
paragraph 6 above.

Without exception, notices of Plaintiffs1

depositions and the continuation of Plaintiff James Johnson's
deposition were sent out each time the depositions were scheduled
in an attempt to compel the appearance of Plaintiffs and to
document Defendants' efforts to depose Plaintiffs.
Affiant further denies the allegations contained in
paragraph 4 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit, that after Mr. Fisher began
his representation of Plaintiffs that Defendants requested that
they

be allowed

to

complete

the

taking of the Plaintiffs'

depositions before Plaintiffs could depose the Defendants. At the
inception of this case, it was agreed between all parties, and
subsequently by Plaintiffs' counsel, that Defendants would be
allowed to completely depose Plaintiffs before Plaintiffs would be
allowed to depose Defendants.

This agreement was confirmed in a

letter from Plaintiffs' counsel dated December 11, 1990.

(A copy

of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 8.) Upon Mr. Fisher's
appearance in this matter, Mr. Fisher was informed of this
agreement regarding the order in which depositions would be taken
and stipulated and agreed to the same.
7.

In response to paragraph 5 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

Affiant denies that Defendant Pat Brian requested a continuance of
the commencement of his deposition until December 1991. Defendant
Pat Brian's deposition was

taken on November 30, 1991, and

completed on December 14, 1991. The court reporter submitted the
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deposition transcripts on December 2, 1991, and December 14, 1991,
respectively.
8.

[See Deposition Transcripts•]

In response to paragraph 6 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

Affiant denies Defendants delayed the taking of the Deposition of
Mr.

Johnson, for the reasons set forth in paragraph 6 above.

Affiant further denies that there was any delay in the taking of
Defendants' depositions based on the need to depose Mrs. Johnson.
Affiant also denies that Defendants "delayed the taking
3f the Depositions of the Defendants until the latter part of
December 1991.H The depositions of Chris L. Schmutz and Defendant
Pat Brian were taken in November and December of 1991, following
^he completion of Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition.

The only

iepositions to which Defendant Nielsen & Senior objected were those
>£ its attorneys, who were neither parties nor witnesses. Affiant
sets forth the following information and history concerning the
tefendants1 depositions and the Motion for Protective Order:
a.

Plaintiffs* Second Amended Complaint alleged, among

rther things, malpractice against Pat B. Brian and Chris L.
chmutz, who were attorneys employed by Nielsen & Senior.

By

irtue of their employment, Plaintiffs also made claims against
efendant Nielsen & Senior.
b«

[See Record.]

On August 16, 1991, Mr. Fisher, via letter, notified

ffiant of his intent to take the depositions of Arthur H. Nielsen,
ary A. Weston, Richard M. Hymas and Larry L. Whyte.
he letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 9.)
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(A copy of

c.

While these four individuals were all attorneys

employed by Nielsen & Senior, neither Mr. Nielsen, nor Mr. Whyte,
were referenced in Plaintiffs1 pleadings.

[See Record.] In fact,

Mr. Nielsen had been out of the country during much of 1986 and
1987, and Mr Whyte was not employed by Defendant Nielsen & Senior
during

1986 or 1987, the relevant time period referenced in

Plaintiffs' complaint.
d.

[See Deposition Transcripts.]

Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Whyte represented Defendant

Nielsen & Senior in the action filed by Plaintiffs.
e.

[See Record.]

On August 27, 1991, Affiant, via letter, responded

to Mr. Fisher's August 16, 1991 letter, advising Mr. Fisher that
Affiant was not aware of any rule authorizing the taking of the
depositions of opposing counsel and that if Mr. Fisher intended to
pursue the taking of these depositions, a motion for protective
order would be filed.

(A copy of the letter is attached hereto as

Exhibit 10.)
f.

On September 3, 1991, Mr. Fisher sent a letter to

Affiant, accompanied

by notices of deposition

for Arthur H.

Nielsen, Gary A. Weston, Richard M. Hymas and Larry L. Whyte. The
last paragraph of his letter states,

H

I am sending to you the

Notices of Depositions so you may apply for a protective order."
(A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 11.)
g.

Shortly after receipt of the notices of depositions,

Defendant Nielsen & Senior served a Motion for Protective Order
accompanied by a memorandum, and the issue was briefed by all
parties.

[See Record.]
-10-
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h.

A

hearing

December 6, 1991.
Nielsen

of

held

in

St.

George,

Utah, on

Among other issues addressed was Defendant

& Senior's

completion

was

oral

Motion

for Protective

argument,

Judge

Order.

Upon the

Christoffersen

Defendant's Motion for Protective Order.

denied

[See Transcript of

Hearing.]
i.
Whyte

The depositions of Messrs. Nielsen, Weston, Hymas &

were taken on December

13, 1991

(in addition

to the

deposition of Christ L. Schmutz, to which neither of the Defendants
Nielsen & Senior nor Pat B. Brian objected), and not the "latter
part of December, 1991* as asserted by Mr. Fisher. The depositions
lasted less than half a day and, combined, totaled less than 160
pages. The court reporter submitted the transcripts of these four
depositions on December 26, 1991.
9#

[See Deposition Transcripts.]

In response to paragraph 7 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

Affiant denies that M[a]t a hearing in December 1991, Defendant Pat
Brian first stated that he intended to file a Counterclaim."

At

the scheduling conference held before Judge Christoffersen on
July 12, 1991, in Logan, Utah, Michael L. Dowdle, counsel for
Defendant Pat B. Brian gave notice of his intention to file a
counterclaim

on

Mr. Fisher was

behalf

of

in attendance

his
at

client
this

against

Plaintiffs.

scheduling

conference.

Or. Dowdle further explained the factual basis of Defendant Pat
Brians counterclaim against Plaintiffs. Mr. Dowdle stated that he
leeded to discover additional information, which he anticipated
*ould be forthcoming in Mr. Johnson's deposition, and that because
-110300.NI211.8500

of the restrictions of Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P., he would be unable to
file

a

counterclaim

until

deposition was completed.

after

Plaintiff

James

Johnson's

[See Hearing Transcript.]

Defendant

Brian's Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim was filed promptly
after the completion of the deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson.
[See Record.] Affiant states that it was through the deposition of
Plaintiff James Johnson that Defendant Pat Brian became aware of
many

facts

supporting

the

claims

contained

in

Mr.

Brian's

counterclaim.
At the December 6, 1991# hearing, Judge Christoffersen
granted

Defendant

Pat

Brian's

Motion

for

Leave

to

File

a

Counterclaim. At that time, upon the insistence of Mr. Fisher, the
trial which had been set for February 3 through 10, 1992, was
continued

to

Transcript*]

February

18

through

28,

1992.

[See

Hearing

Upon the signing of the Court's Order granting

Defendant Pat Brian's Motion for Leave to File a Counterclaim in
January 1992, Mr* Fisher moved to continue the trial. The February
18 through 28 trial setting was stricken and trial was rescheduled
for May 5 through 14,
paragraph

8 of Mr*

1992.

Fisher's

[See Record.]

In response to

Affidavit, Affiant

denies

that

Mr. Fisher filed an Interlocutory Appeal in approximately January
1991*

On April 3, 1992,

Plaintiffs filed with the Utah Supreme

Court a Petition for Permission to File Interlocutory Appeal from
this Court's Order granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

[See Record•]
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10.

In response to paragraph 9 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

Affiant states that Plaintiffs' Petition for Permission to File
Interlocutory Appeal was denied on May 21, 1992.

In June 1992, a

court hearing was held, via telephone, in which counsel for all
parties participated.

During said hearing, the trial was set and

scheduled for November 2 through 23, 1992.

Judge Christoffersen

instructed that this new trial be inserted in the Pre-Trial Order
and that the Pre-Trial Order be filed.
11.

It was the obligation of Plaintiffs, by and through their

attorney, Darwin C. Fisher, to prepare the Pre-trial Order, which
they failed to do.
January 1992.

Originally, the Pre-trial Order was due in

Defendants prepared and submitted to Plaintiffs'

counsel several drafts of a proposed Pre-trial Order.

However,

Mr. Fisher refused to agree to any of the proposed Pre-trial Orders
and was uncooperative in assisting Affiant in preparing a joint
Pre-trial Order. Further, Mr. Fisher failed in his duty to prepare
and file a Pre-trial Order with the Court.

It has been Affiant*s

understanding since June 1992 that the trial was set for November 2
through 13, despite Mr. Fisher's failure to prepare or file a PreTrial Order.

At

the

time Mr. Fisher

filed his Notice of

Withdrawal, Affiant was preparing for trial.
12.

In response to paragraph 10 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

Affiant denies the same in its entirety, including the allegations
that Defendants

"were uncooperative

in Discovery,"

"made no

attempts to move this case along," and "deliberately postponed the
:aking of the Depositions of the Defendants until the Discovery
-130300.NI211.8500

period had almost elapsed,M for the reasons set forth in paragraphs
6 and 9 above.
13.

In response to paragraph 11 of Mr. Fisher's Affidavit,

Affiant denies that Mr. Fisher "did not object to the taking of the
Deposition of the natural mother."

Despite his representations to

the contrary, Mr. Fisher did object to the taking of the natural
mother's deposition by Defendant

Nielsen & Senior, requiring

Defendant Nielsen & Senior to argue the matter to the Court, via a
telephone hearing, in order to obtain permission to proceed with
the deposition on June 30, 1992.
Plaintiffs1

initially noticed the deposition of the

natural mother for April 9, 1992.

[See Record.]

On the date of

the deposition, counsel for all parties appeared at the time and
placed scheduled.

However, the natural mother failed to appear.

Prior to Affiant returning to his office, the natural mother spoke
with Mr. Fisher on the telephone, indicating her inability to
attend the deposition that day. Mr. Fisher assured Affiant that he
would reschedule the deposition as soon as possible. Not until May
1992, nearly six weeks later, did Mr. Fisher notify Affiant that,
after speaking with the natural mother, he had decided not to
reschedule

her

deposition,

at

which

time

Affiant

notified

Mr. Fisher that Nielsen & Senior would like to take her deposition
before May 20, 1992. (See Exhibit 12.) Defendant Nielsen & Senior
immediately

noticed

the

earliest possible date.

natural

mother's

deposition

for the

By letter dated June 4, 1992, Affiant

notified Mr. Fisher of Defendant Nielsen & Senior's desire to
-1420300.NI211.8500

depose the natural mother as soon as possible and stated if no
response was received by June 16, 1992, Affiant would proceed to
schedule her deposition and have subpoena served, which he did. (A
copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 13 •)

Not until

June 19, 1992, after the subpoena had been served, did Mr* Fisher
respond by letter dated June 19, 1992, suggesting deposition dates
yet another four to six weeks away,
attached hereto as Exhibit 14.)

(A copy of the letter is

By letter dated June 24, 1992,

Affiant responded to Mr. Fisher, saying that the Court had directed
that the deposition of the natural mother proceed as noticed.

(A

copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 15.)
14.

In response to paragraph 12 of Mr. Fishers Affidavit,

Affiant denies he or any of the other attorneys for Defendants
argued to the Court "that they could not get a date that was
available to Nielsen & Senior and to Judge Brian (to take the
deposition of the natural mother) prior to the [sic] November 1992
which was the date all parties believed to be the trial date," for
the reasons set forth in paragraph 14, above. Defendant Nielsen &
Senior was desirous of taking the deposition of the natural mother
as soon as possible.

Mr. Fisher ultimately objected to the date

selected for the deposition.

He argued to the Court that he was

involved in other matters, which he could not change, and as a
result thereof he was unable to attend the natural mother's
deposition on June 30, 1992, and requested it be rescheduled at a
later date.

However, Mr. Fisher failed to inform the Court that

the other matters which he could not change were depositions which
-15£0300.NI211.8500

he

(Mr, Fisher) had noticed in another case in which he was

representing Plaintiffs, entitled Steven Davis and Kristi Davis v.
H«B. Layne Contractors, Inc., filed in the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, as Civil No.
91-C-769G.

Furthermore, in requiring that the deposition proceed

as noticed, the Court allowed Mr. Davis to cross-exam the natural
mother at a later date if he so desired and further allowed a
representative of Mr. Fisher's to be in attendance at the natural
mother's deposition to take notes. Mr. Fisher's paralegal, Sylvia
Bundrandt sat in on the natural mother's deposition and took notes,
and Affiant is unaware of any subsequent attempt by Mr. Fisher to
pursue any cross-examination.
15.

In response to the allegations of Richard C. Coxson as

contained in his Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial
Under Rule 59, Affiant states that he was in attendance at the
March 11, 1993, hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Under Rule
41(b), U.R.Civ.P., and that during that hearing, counsel for all
parties, including Mr. Coxson, were given a full opportunity to
engage in argument and rebuttal argument.

Further, Affiant

assisted in the preparation of Defendant Nielsen & Senior's motion
to dismiss and the memorandum in support of that motion.
has

reviewed

said

documents

and,

in Affiant1 s

Affiant

opinion, no

misrepresentations of law or fact are contained therein.

Affiant

also assisted in the preparation of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and has reviewed the same. Again, to the best
of Affiant's knowledge, no misrepresentations of law or fact are
-1620300.NI211.8500

contained therein.

Finally, Affiant denies that any of the

Defendants or their attorneys have misrepresented any facts to this
Court, or have engaged in any misconduct or misbehavior.

Affiant

denies that the Honorable Venoy Christoffersen engaged in any
misconduct or was a party to any misrepresentations.
16.

In response to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum,

Affiant denies that the deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson was
delayed because of Defendants, for the reasons set forth in
paragraph 6 above.
17.

In response to paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum,

Affiant denies that Plaintiffs have had only three attorneys and
that the number of attorneys retained by Plaintiffs is irrelevant.
These assertions are contrary to the findings of fact previously
submitted to this Court and to which Plaintiffs failed to object.
18•

In response to paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's Memorandum,

Affiant states that Mr. Coxson was not present at the July 12,
1991, scheduling conference in Logan, Utah, and therefore has no
knowledge as to what was said or done. Affiant further states that
at the July 12, 1991, scheduling conference Mr. Fisher failed and
refused to engage in any meaningful discussion as to resolution of
the case, citing his lack of familiarity with the case.
19.

In response to paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Memorandum,

\ffiant denies that Defendants "vigorously opposed having their
iepositions taken until the completion of the Deposition of James
and Jennifer Johnson," for the reasons previously set forth herein,
defendant Nielsen & Senior opposed the taking of the depositions of
-179300.NI211.8500

the attorneys defending it, and filed an appropriate motion for
protective order.

The motion for protective order was wholly

unrelated to the agreement between the parties as to the order of
depositions.
20.

In response to paragraphs 6, 8 and 9 of Plaintiffs'

Memorandum, regarding the dates and circumstances surrounding
Defendant Pat Brian's deposition, Affiant denies the same for the
reasons previously set forth herein.
21.

In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Memorandum,

Affiant denies that "Defendants did not reveal the name of their
expert until shortly before discovery cut off in January 1992" and
that "Defendants refused to schedule a deposition until April of
1992, shortly before trial scheduled
Defendants

filed

their

Designation

for May 5-14 of 1992."
of

Expert

November 15, 1991/ pursuant to this Court's Order.

Witnesses

on

[See Record.]

The witnesses named included Brent L. Hoggan, Esq., Lewis A.
Moench, M.D., and L. Deane Smith, CPA. Plaintiffs have never taken
any action to schedule the depositions of Dr. Moench or Mr. Smith.
Plaintiffs took no action to schedule the deposition of Mr. Hoggan
until April 15, 1991, just two weeks prior to discovery cutoff.
(See Affidavit of Sylvia Bundrandt, a copy of which is attached
hereto as Exhibit 15.) Mr. Fisher claims to have had a conflict on
the only date on which Mr. Hoggan was available to be deposed prior
to discovery cutoff.

(See Affidavit of Darwin Fisher, a copy of

which is attached hereto as Exhibit 16.)

Defendant Nielsen &

Senior and its counsel cooperated with Mr. Fisher in his taking the
-1820300.N1211.8500

deposition of Mr. Hoggan, one of Defendants expert witnesses,
beyond the time for discovery cutoff, despite the fact that
Plaintiffs had known the identity of Defendants* expert witnesses
for five (5) months, during which time no attempt was made by
Plaintiffs to contact such witnesses.

(See Affiant's May 5, 1992,

letter and Michael Dowdle's May 7, 1992, letter, copies of which
are attached hereto as Exhibit 17.)
22.

In response to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum,

Affiant denies that the "May trial date was not stricken due to
lack of preparation for trial- by Plaintiffs' counsel, for the
reasons previously set forth herein.
23.

In response to paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum,

Affiant denies the reason no trial was held in November 1992 is
because

"the Court

failed

to schedule" it,

for the reasons

previously set forth herein, and further denies that the Court
refused, at any time, to set trial.
24.
Affiant

In response to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum,
denies

that

Defendants

made

any

representations

to

Mr. Fisher or to the Court that June 30, 1992, was the only date
before trial that Defendants could take the deposition of the
natural mother, for the reasons previously set forth herein.
Affiant further states that Plaintiffs did oppose the taking of
Mrs. Magleby's deposition, that Mr. Fisher offered dates in July
1992 for the taking of the deposition, and that Defendants were
required to obtain an order from the Court to proceed with the
deposition as scheduled.
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DATED t h i s J f i ^ d a y of A p r i l , 1 9 9 3 .

LARR

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 7J\

ih

day of April,

1992,
VAxJtL
U).
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Address and Commission
ltionN<EJE6ffQT BLQBfcK:
PAULA W. LARSEN

C^>(AS
AA^Jyyy^

60 E. South Tcmpto #1100
S*ttUk#Clty,UUh $4111
My CommiMiofi € x * f t t

Ju<»23.1996
OTATg OF UTAH

L

:ERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this ^ffQVday of April, 1993, I have
served the AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L, WHYTE by causing a true and
correct copy of the same to be sent, through the United States
mails, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Richard C. Coxson, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
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LAW OFFICES

CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 SOUTH 4000 WEST
WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 8412^'
D D. CONDER
R. WANGSGARD

TELEPHONE:
(801) 967-5500

. BENNETT
rnJER
..ROGNUE

FACSIMILE:
(801) 967-5563

December ""

^990

Larry L. Whyte
Nielson & Senior
100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah fH I I L
Johnson's v.. Nielson & Senior, et» al,
Hoar lj»"i! vy i
Enclosed is a letter 1 recently received from Dr. Ralph
Gant.
Based upon the information and opinion stated in that
letter, it appears that Mr* Johnson will not be available to
complete his deposition until sometime after the first of the
year. Please call me at your earliest convenience so that we may
discuss the scheduling of his deposition.
Very yfltri^v^Yours,

PLR/11
Enclosures

EXHIBIT 1

ASSOCIATED CLINICAL SERVICES
RALPH W. GANT, Ph.D., PSYCHOLOGIST
PLAZA 4500
716 EAST 4500 SOUTH, SUITE N150
MURRAY, UTAH 84107-3080
(801) 263-1103

December 7, 1990

Mr.
4059

e
Pf0r
r:^S^m^4^^^
South 4000 West

West Valley City,
RE:

UT

84120

Mr. Steven Davis
9866 North Meadow Lane
Highland, UT 84003

Dear Mr. Rognlie:
I have reviewed the reported conditions of Mr. Steven Davis during
the deposition in which he participated on November 28, 29, and
30th. I met with Mr* Davis and his wife on December 1, 1990. I
saw them again on December 4, 1990. On both occasions Mr. Davis
presented with extreme stress, including severe depression, and
significant evidence of an anxiety state with possible episodes of
panic. In reviewing Mr. Davis's reported behavior during that
three-day period, and again on into December 1, 1990, Mr. Davis
exhibited significant signs of depersonalization, a condition in
which Mr. Davis was probably detached from his own behavior. He
reported a strange, perception of "not being myself, not being in
control of myself." His wife stated that she had never before seen
him in such stress during their years of acquaintance and marriage.
During the December 1, 1990 interview I recommended that Mr. Davis
consult his physician regarding his stress. I received a phone
call on December 4, 1990 for Doran Porter, M.D., 2230 North
University Parkway., Ste. 1-A, Provo, UT 84604. Dr. Porter and
I discussed Mr. Davis's extreme presenting stress, and Dr. Porter's
intention to prescribe Welbutrin for depression, and one of^ the
benzoidazepines to assist Mr. Davis in managing his anxiety and his
symptoms of panic.
Given Mr. Davis's extremely stressful conditions during those three
days of deposition, I request your postponement of any further
4eposition until there has been time to fully assess Mr. Davis's
presenting conditions and to determine whether or not Mr. Davis
will be able to continue the deposition in the near future.

Page 2
Mr- Rognlie, Esq,
RE: Mr. Steven Davis

On December 1, 1990, on-reviewing Mr* Davis's current conditions
and his mental status, it was my feeling that we should first
attempt medical management of his stress over the next few weeks,
with supportive psychotherapy* Failing this, I will hospitalize
Mr. Davis until in my judgement his stressful condition no longer
constitutes a real danger to himselfJPlease call me if y o u have any questions related to this matter*
Res-pec Wully,

Ral^h^fo
Psychology
RWG/bs
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Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS
215 South State #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
UK

J(iliuboij,

el d L

v.. N i e l s e n & S e n i o r , e t

al.

Dear Mike:

Pursuant to your recent request, enc]_oseci please find a copy
of the transcript of the deposition of James A, Johnson taken
November 28 through November 3 0 , 1990. You will note that there
are three volumes to this deposition. Also enclosed please find
deposition summaries of each of the three volumes which we have
had our paralegals prepare in this matter and a memo which has
been prepared regarding the misspelled words and errors that
currently exist in the deposition.
We have made the Court
Reporter aware of these errors and she is correcting them
apparently, and will send us a now ropy of the deposition when
it's prepared.
Hopefully this copy of the deposition transcript as well as
the copies of the deposition summary will aid you in preparing
for Mr. Davis* upcoming deposition. As indicated to you this
morning on the telephonef we will refrain from taking any further
action in this matter until* Friday by virtue of an agreement
reached between Arthur and. Mr. Irvine, Mr. Davis' proposed
counsel.
\ i'

If we can be of further assistance, please
on tact us,
Very t r u 1 y y\"\\

L

NIELSEN & SENIOR

LLW:pr
Enclosures

^ ^ 7 ?

EXHIBIT 2

Whyte

i(

i

NIE
IELSEN

FILE CQP^

<S£ ENIOR
\^/

wr H. Nielsen
f A. Weston
lay Peck
R. Sabin
on j . Morris**
tennis lckes«t
k H. Anderson*
ent Ludlow
ird M. Hymas
•C Mangum
MdlCHincks
S.Hyde
*f P.Faust
. Mohlman
ynn P. Fineshriber
UWhyte*
m F. Allrede

Attorneys & Counselors
Since 1882
A Professional Corporation

Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza & Office Tower
60 East South Temple, Salt Uke City, Utah 84111

Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925)
Clair M. Senior (1901-1965)

Post Office Box 11808, Salt Uke City, Utah 84147

Telephone: (801) S32-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913

Senior Counsel
Hugh C Carrier
Of Counsel
Raymond T. Senior

March

Licensed to Practice in
e Arizona
* California
t Navajo Bar
• New York

A. Jackson

• Washington,, O.C

:ia L laTulippe

)avid R. Irvine, Esq.
349 South 200 Eastr Suite 1.70
3alt Lake City, UT 84111
IE: Johnsonf el a I

Uielsen & Senior, e t a L

)c in M . Irvine:
On March 1 f 1991r Plaintiffs represented to me that they had
eearned you to represent them in the above-referenced matter,
'hereafter, both Arthur Nielsen and I left telephone messages for
ou which culminated in two telephone conversations between you
nd Arthur Nielsen, one or about March 7, 1991# and the other on
r about March 12, 1991. After your telephone conversation with
rthur Nielsen on or about March 12 , 1991, we expected to hear"
ack from you by March 15 , 1991, as to whether or not you would
e making an appearance in this matter. Having heard no word
rom you, despite several telephone messages having been left
ith your office, we can only presume that you do not represent
he plaintiffs in this matter. As such, we must proceed forward
5 if the plaintiffs arp not- represented by counsel.
As a courtesy
Dcuments:

we enclose copies of

I I %*
< n.ir<i ,:

if
I

i i
( in

! 2 %rc
'in i1 iii\J

1«

Amended Notice of Continuance of Deposition, noticing
up the depositions
"
plaintiffs beginning March
28, 1991.

2.

Subpoena Duces Tecum for the taking of tue
of Walter R. "Budw Ellett for March 28, 1991,

3.

Subpoena Duces Tecum for the takio*
of Brad Englund for March 28, 1991.

EXHIBIT 3

1

Il

>n
• i on,

David R. I r v i n e , Esq*
March 2 0 , 1991
Page 2

4*

N o t i c e t o Submit f o r Decision
N i e l s e n & S e n i o r t o Compel

Motion

of

Defendant

We l o o k f o r w a r d t o r e c e i v i n g a copy of t h e N o t i c e o f
Appearance i n t h i s m a t t e r s h o u l d you d e c i d e t o r e p r e s e n t t h e
plaintiffs*
Very t r u l y y o u r s ,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

LLW:tbf
End,
cc:

James A. and Jennifer L. Johnson (w/encl.)
Chris L. Schmutzr Esq. (w/encl.)
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (w/encl.)

tni

ASSOCIATED CLINICAL SERVICES
RALPH W. GANT, Ph. D . , PSYCHOLOGJ S
PLAZA 4500
I EAST 4500 SOUTH, SUITE N150
MURRAY, UTAH 84107-3080
(801) 263-1103
March 21, 19 91
The Honorable VeNoy Christot'lersen
Attn: Pam Blackura
140 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84321
I

Steve Davis
9866 North Meadow Lane
Hiland, I JT 8 4 003

Dear Judge Christoffersen:
Mr. Steve Davis, who has been given notice of Continuance Of
Deposition for the date of 03-28-91, Is in no condition to
participate in such a stressful experience. Mr. Davis, who is in
severe major depression, was on the anti-depressant: Wellbutrin,
prescribed by Dr. Doran Porter. However, unfortunately, Mr* Davis
has been unable to afford the medication and, in fact, has been off
the medication for a period of about forty-seven days. While Mr.
Davis has just now been able to obtain funds to purchase the
medication, the effect of the medication will probably not be
stabilized by the date and hour indicated on the notice dated 03?n-91.
behalf of my patient, Mr. Steve Davis, ± respectfully request
that this Continuance Of Deposition be postponed for a period of
approximatelyonfe-monthuntilthe
medication effects
have
stabilized, and until I have been able to work with Mr* Davis more
on the problem of mis extreme stress reaction to this process.
cease

call me at/2 6 3-110 3 ii y m In
A

Gant, P h . D .
g i s t , Lie, l.ilt
RWG/bs
Mi
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JAMES A JOHNSON
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON
PO BOX 1841
Orem, Utah 84059-1841
Arthur II. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah P^in
FAX (801) 532-1913
lie:

Depositions of the Johnsons

Gentlemen:
We received notice of our Depositions on March 22, 1991 and
respectfully request that they be rescheduled for the following
reasons:
1
..~ —.^ stili in the fi nal stages of negotiations for
legal representation. We have a rough draft in hand and it
should be finalized in the near future. A unexpected delay has
been th possibly of a co-counsel moving out of state.
2.
g e c a u s e 0 f the withdrawal of counsel of Condei &
Wangsgard, we are in a "fee arbitration" dispute before the Utah
State Bar. Until this fee dispute is resolved, some attornies
are hesitant t~o consider *-~ represent us.
3
Ralph Gantf .-^ **«*, requested ad recommended
directly to Judge Christoffersen
that our
lepositions be
postponed for another 30 days. When we are in receipt of a copy
of this recommendation, we will forward it to you.
March 26th, Defendant James A.
4^
M o s t a ^ 0 f the week of
Johnson will be out-of-town. It is doubtful that he will be able
to change his schedule.
Sincerely,

'ames A. Jorayson
cc:

Michael L. Dowdle,
i
Ghris L. Schmutz
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen
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July 5, 1991

• California
t Navajo 8ar
t New York

• Washington, O.C

SENT VIA FACSIMILE AND FIRST CLASS MAIL
Darwin C. Fisherr Esq.
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER
Jamestown Square# Suite #200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Re:

James A. Johnson, et al. v, Nielsen & Senior, et al,
Civil No* 900400460

)ear Darwin:
Enclosed please find a Notice of Continuance, continuing
'our clients1 depositions without date in the above-referenced
latter. This action was taken as a result of the re-scheduling
>f the settlement conference until July 12, 1991•
Inasmuch as it has been our understanding as well as the
greement of the parties since the commencement of this action,
hat Pat B. Brian1s deposition would not be taken until we
onclude taking your clients1 depositions, we presume that his
eposition which was previously scheduled for July 19 and 20
hall likewise be continued without date and shall be taken at
ome time following our completion of the taking of your clients1
epositions.
We would remind you that the Settlement Conference currently
cheduled for July 12, 1991, at 4:00 p.m., before Judge
iristofferson will be ineffectual as to the resolution of this
itter unless you immediately provide us a detailed summary of
>ur clients damages with back-up documentation* As you know, we
ive previously requested this material on numerous occasions and
>u have indicated to me that you would provide it to us prior to
te settlement conference. We therefore look forward with much
iticipation to this long awaited information.

EXHIBIT 6

Finallyr having received no response to our June 26, 1991/
letter we would remind you that we expect the immediate
production of the documents requested therein. You are advised
that the documents which we are demanding production of were
ordered to be produced by the court pursuant to our motion to
compel*
Failure to produce these documents prior to July 12,
1991, will leave us with no alternative but to bring this matter
before the court at the time of the settlement conference seeking
the appropriate sanctions*
We would hope that this course of
action would not be necessary.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please
feel free to call me.
Very truly yours,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

LLW.lls
Enclosure
cc: Michael L. Dowdle (w/Encl.)
Chris L. Schmutz (w/Encl*)

13232.NI211.LS
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Darwin C, Fisher, EsqNIELSON, HILL & FISHER
3319 North University Avenue, Suite #200
Provo, Utah 84604
RE:

Johnson, et al. v. Nielsen & Senior, et a L
Deposition of Steven C. Davis

Dear Mr, Fisher:
On or about January 9, 1991, we received notification from
your client's prior counsel that your client was unable to
continue with the taking of his deposition due to a psychological
problem. This position was supported by a letter dated December
7, 1990 from Ralph W. Gant, a copy of which is enclosed for your
convenience.
In order for us to continue with your client's deposition,
we believe it is necessary to obtain written verification from
Mr* Gant of your client's psychological and/or emotional well
being, in light of his alleged condition. In light of the short
time remaining for discovery in this matter, we look forward to
receiving this verification as soon as possible, particularly
since we need to complete the taking of your client's depositions
before the taking of any others.
Thank you for your anticipated cooperation in this matter.
Very truly yours,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

LLW:pr
c c : Michael L. Dowdle
C h r i s L. Schmutz

Larry^L, Whyte

EXHIBIT 7

LAW OFFICES

CONDER & WANGSGAKD
4059 SOUTH 4000 WEST
WEST VAIUY CITY. UTAH 8<i2(Moy9
JERHAlD D. CONDE*
SCOTT fL VANGSGAUD

TELEPHONE:
(601) 9*7-5300

KMKC BENNETT
L.G.CUUER
ftlBR L ROGNU£

FACSTMUS:

December 11, 1990
Michael L. Dovdle, Esq*
Allanf Nelson, Hardy & Evans
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Re: Johnson's v« Nielsen & Senior/ et« al„
Dear Mike:
Enclosed is the letter from Dr. Ralph W, Gant I discussed
with you today. As 1 mentioned/ because of the apparent delay in
completing the deposition of Mr* Johnson, I do not anticipate
taking Judge Brian%A deposition before February, 1990.

PLR/11
Enclosure
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NIELSON, HILL 6C FISHER
A T T O R N E Y S A T LAW
Dououis A. NIKLSON. P.C.
RICHARD L. HIIX. P.C.
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84604

August 16, 1991

Larry Whyte
Nielson and Senior
60 East South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Re:

Johnson v Nielson and Senior

Dear Larry,
I would like to take the depositions of Art Nielson, Gary
Weston, Richard Hymas and yourself following my client's
Depositions and the depositions already scheduled for Judge Brian
and Chris Schmutz.
Would you please check the schedules of those individuals and
notify me of the dates that they would be available • I do not
anticipate that depositions will be lengthy and should be concluded
within a day or a day and a half* I will be attending a seminar
the 11th, 12th , and 13th of September and will not be available for
the taking of those depositions.
Please give me a call at your earliest convenience so that we
may coordinate our calendars.
Thank you,
Very truly yours,

Darwin C. Fisher
Attorney at Law
DCF/sab
f:\fiahltr\whyte.814
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Darwin C. Fisher, Esq.
NIELSON, HILL & FISHER
3319 North University Avenue, Suite #200
Provo, Utah 84064
RE:

Johnson. et al. v. Nielsen & Senior, et al,
DEPOSITIONS

Dear Mr, Fisher:
I have had an opportunity to check with all counsel
regarding the proposed dates for the taking of depositions. You
are advised that the following dates are available for the taking
of depositions:
October 7 through 11, 1991 and November 18 through 22, 1991.
With respect to your August 16, 1991 letter, you are advised
that we object to, and will vigorously oppose, the taking of the
depositions of Arthur Nielsen and Larry Whyte. We are unfamiliar
with any authority allowing you to take the depositions of
opposing counsel. It is also our inclination to object to your
taking the depositions of Gary Weston and Richard Hymas. If you
intend to pursue with the taking of any of these depositions, we
would expect you to provide us with a detailed list of the
proposed areas of inquiry and sufficient notice so that we might
timely apply to the Court for a Protective Order.
Sincerely,
NIELSEN & SENIOR

LLW:pr
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A T T O R N E Y S A T LAW
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September 3 , 1991

Larry Whyte
Nielson and Senior
60 E. South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, Ut 84111
Re:

Johnson v Nielson & Senior

Dear Lar£y#
I am enclosing herewith Notice of Depositions* If there is a
problem \*ith the dates and times, please contact me.
It is my understanding that Arthur Nielson, Larry Whyte,
Richard Hymas and Gary Weston are members of the law firm of
Nielson and Senior who is a defendant in this matter* By being
members of the law firm of Nielson and Senior they are subject to
having their testimony taken by deposition* The fact that some of
those individuals are also acting as defence counsel 9 does not give
them immunity to the taking of their depositions* I assume that
the choice to serve as ones own attorney was made with full
knowledge that those individual(s) may be called as witnesses* I
have not objected to the fact that potential witness are also
serving as attorneys in this matter and do not intend to do so.
However# I do intend to take the deposition of all individuals I
feel may have knowledge regarding this matter.
I am sending to you the Notices of Depositions so you may
apply for a Protective Order.
Thank you.
Very t r u l y yours f

Darwin
Attorney a t Law
DCF/sab
Enclosure
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Darwin C. Fisher, Esq.
HILL, HILL & FISHER
3319 North University, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Re:

Johnson, et al. v. Nielsen & Seniorr et al.

Dear Darwin:
This letter confirms our earlier conversation regarding the
taking of the deposition of LizAnne Magleby. Now that you have
completed your trial, we would appreciate your notifying us at
your earliest convenience as to when you anticipate taking
LizAnne*s deposition. As I have indicated to you previously, we
would like to take the deposition of LizAnne prior to May 22,
1992. We would appreciate your notifying us at your earliest
convenience as to the date scheduled for LizAnne's deposition.
If you are unable to schedule her deposition prior to May 22,
1992/ please contact us immediately.
Very truly yours,
NIELSEN & SENIOR^ P.C.

tortL/^W '^
LLW/cas
cc:

Michael L. Dowdle

cas:letr:12076.NI211.8500
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J u n e 4 , 1992

Darwin C. F i s h e r , E s q .
HILL, HILL & FISHER
200 JAmestown S q u a r e
3319 North U n i v e r s i t y Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
RE:

J o h n s o n , e t a l « , v« N i e l s e n & s e n i o r , e t a l -

Dear Darwin:
WQ tried to you" reach you earlier in the week by telephonef but
have been unable to talk with you. As such I am writing to notify
you that we do not intend to wait until mid or late July to take
LizAnne's deposition. Under the circumstances# such a wait is
simply unacceptable. As such we intend to take her deposition sometime this month. If you would like input on scheduling the date
of her deposition please call. If we do not hear from you by
Wednesdayi June 10, 1992 we will go ahead and schedule her deposition
and send you notice of the same.

Sincerelyr
N i e l s e n & Senior, p.C.

cc:

M i c h a e l Dowdle

EXHIBIT 13
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June 19r 1992

Larry !*• Whyte
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Poet Office Box 11808
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
Re:

Johnson v Nielsen & Senior# et al-

Dear Larry,
I am writing you in pursuance to our telephone conversation of
this morningf June 18, 1992f concerning the scheduling of the
deposition of Lizanne Engemann. As you recall, we spent some
considerable time on the telephone discussing available dates and
X had indicated to you that on June 30 I had depositions in another
matter which had been scheduled for some period of time*
I
understand that you no longer have the list of dates that we
covered on the telephone and therefore I am sending with this
letter a listing of dates that I have available for the taking of
Lizanne's deposition«
I understand that Mr# Nielsen wishes to take Lizanne's
deposition as quickly as possible and will be happy to cooperate
and felt I had done so by supplying you with dates in our previous
telephone conversation*
If Mr. Nielsen will not agree to a new date for the
deposition, please contact me immediately as I will need to contact
Judge Christofferson and have him rule whether or not the
deposition will take place on June 30, 1992.
Please contact me at your earliest convenience regarding a new
date*
Thank you.
Very truly yours
"Darwin C. Fisher
Attorney at Law
DCP/sab
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Mr, Fisher has the following dates open to attend the deposition of
Lizanne EngemannJ
July
July
July
July

13
15-17
20-24
27-31

Please contact our office as soon as another date is set so that we
may reserve it on his calendar. The days are filling up quickly.

NJELSEN
^
Arthur H.Ni«Ue«

"IENIOR

Siittc 110G, €*&> C«t€ fitu

C«ryA.W«*(on

L Of<k*To**r

C*cW*yPeck

60 E**< Sooth T«i»pk, S*k Ufc* C t y Utih *411t

I t Dennfe kfce««t
M»ricH.AncJcnorr*
ft. ftGentludlow
*kh*t*M.Hyfn*i
fo*Ht K. M*ngum
ttchardlCHtadat

* * 4 O f f k * Bo* t 1 4 * . Salt Ufa* CHy, U u h 84147

A frofctttooat Corporation
Edvrtn VV. Senior (136MS2SJ
CUlr M. Senk* ( i » M f c 5 )

Tdephortt: (601) &M90O - Tclecopfcr (KM SS3-T* J

Senior Counsel
Hugh C C4m«#
CX Counsel
Ktyroond T. Senior
MfltOo I. Morris

NodS-Hpfc

ftob^rtP-Fnttt
Jay ILMotamftft
*rf*rtfpm P. ftK*hrtber
UrryLWhyte*
ScevttiF. Alfred*
Pitrfca L UTt/tippe

June 24, 1992

IxtMtd to fmcUce In
*A/tt4fU

'ClKfafu*
« Wtthirigton, 0 . G

Darwin C# Fisher, Esq.
KILL, HILL 6 FISHER
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Prove, Utah 84604
Re*

vift PACSTMlXg TRANSMISSION
1-375-3865

Jphnsffflr-ftt al. y» NjglS.en & genjoyret
Deposition of LisAnne Engemann Hagleby

njr

Dear Darwin;
This letter serves to confirm my understanding following a
telephone conference yesterday with Judge Christof fersen, Michael
Dowdle, you and me.
As you will recall, Judge Chriatoffersen
Indicated that we could proceed with the taking of the deposition
of ttlzAiuie Engemann Hagleby on June 30, 1992, despite your
representation that you would not attend.
Please be advised
that we intend to move forward and take Mrs- Magleby's deposition
on June 30th commencing at 9?30 a,iu at the place indicated in
the Notice of Deposition, a copy of which you have previously
received.
You are invited to attend and cross examine the
witness.
Very truly yours,
NIELSEN £ SENIOR, P.C.

!<LW/cas

cc:

Michael L» Dowdle>/

ca*aetr!l21G6,HI211«850O
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080
HILL, HILL & FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiff
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

]
!

AFFIDAVIT OF SYLVIA BUNDRANT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
I
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, I

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
:
)

ss:

SYLVIA BUNDRANT, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
says:
1*

I am the paralegal/secretary for plaintiffs' counsel,

Darwin C. Fisher.
2.

I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit •

3.

All

the

statements

hereinafter

set

forth

in

this

Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal and direct
knowledge of the matter to which said statements pertain.

EXHIBIT 16

If

called as a witness by a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able
and shall testify as to each and all of said matters in the manner
hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit.
4.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the

State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years •
5.

Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert

witness, Mr. L. Brent Hoggan's secretary on the 15th day of April,
1992,

to try and set a time for his deposition.

I was then

informed by a return call from his office that he would not be
available until the last week in April.
6.

Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert

witness, Mr. Hoggan, on the 30th day of April, 1992 to try and set
a time for his deposition and Mr. Hoggan was unavailable.
DATED this T

day of May, 1992.

IA ATBUNTOANT

STATE OF UTAH
ss

COUNTY OF UTAH

is
On this

7

. day of May, 1992, personally appeared before me

Sylvia A. Bundrant, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

TONYA&ADAMS
eae<*283
OraMJtah W0S9
My Coowfcsfoa&P&es: 8-22-94

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the
foregoing on this

y^1

JjltfJA'

day of

, 1992, by

first-class, U«S« mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Judge Pat B. Brian
c/o Mark Dowdle
615 W. 200 S.
Salt Lake City, UT

84111

Arthur Nielsen
Larry Whyte
Nielsen & Senior
60 E* South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

\clientdf \ john«on\«.f fidav. mmb
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

j
]

AFFIDAVIT OF
DARWIN C. FISHER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
I
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, |

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF UTAH )

ss:

I, Darwin C. Fisher, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states:
1.

I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs in the above

entitled matter.
2.

I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit*

All the statements hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit are made
by me on the basis of my personal and direct knowledge of the
matter to which said statements pertain*
1
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If called as a witness by

a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able and shall testify as
to each and all of said matters in the manner hereinafter set forth
in this Affidavit*
3.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the

State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years•
4.

I was informed that Mr. L. Brent Hoggan, the defendants'

expert witness, would not be available for the taking of his
deposition until the last week of April, 1992.
5.

That your affiant contacted Mr. Whyte, counsel for

Nielsen & Senior, and was told that defendants would not agree to
an extension of the discovery cut-off date and the deposition of
Mr. Hoggan must be taken within the last week of April, 1992 prior
to May 1, 1992.
6.

That your affiant informed Mr. Whyte that he would make

every effort in order to take Mr. Hoggan's deposition, however,
your affiant was in trial from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

After 5:00

p.m. your affiant was occupied in preparing for the next day's
trial. That your affiant was unable to take the deposition during
the last week of April, 1992, because of your affiant's involvement
in trial in another matter*
7*

That defendants' counsel was fully aware that your

affiant was to be involved in the jury trial from the 7th day of
April, 1992, as defendants' counsel was working closely with the
2

counsel for the defendants in the other matter and knew that your
affiant had entered an appearance to act as co-counsel in that
matter•
8*

It is apparent to your affiant that defendants have

prohibited the taking of the deposition of their expert witness by
requiring the deposition to be taken the last few days of April
1992*
DATED this

. 1992.

day of

Darwin C. Fisher
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF UTAH

On t h i s

)

cT1

appeared b e f o r e

day of

M/ZUf^

me Darwin C. F i s h e r ,

, 1992, p e r s o n a l l y
signer

of

the

foregoing

instrument, who d u l y acknowledged t o me t h a t he executed t h e same.
SYLVIA A. BUNDRANT

HjL>

Kownpwuc.miZitvw

3319 HOaTHUNIVJWE. #200
NELSON HILL &RSHER
PR0VO.UTAH84G04

Y PUBLIC

COMM. EXP. 1-20-96

3

MtUltOzUt/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid
a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this

y

Maf

, 1992, to the following:
Arthur E. N i e l s e n
Larry L. Whyte
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Pat B. Brian
c / o Michael L. Dowdle
915 West 100 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84104
James A. and Jennifer L« Johnson
and a c o u r t e s y copy of same t o :
The Honorable Venoy Christof ferson
875 Rio V i r g i n #217
St* George, Utah 84770

11 \cl£«ntdf \davis«tv. ado\af fad* .dcf

4

^P

day of

IELSEN
NIE
&£ENIOR

FILE GOP

i f Attorneys & Counselors
^ " ^ S<«ce t«82

wr H. Nielsen
f A. Weston
lay Peck
>W A. Ranquist*0
R. Sabin
ennis lckes«t
k. H. Anderson*
snt Ludlow
ud M. Hymas
K. Mangum
ifd K. Hincks
S.Hyde
i t P. Faust
lig Smith*
. Mohlman
I B. Hartvigsen«*
ynn P. Fineshnber
LWhyte*
« F. Allrede
V. Priebe*
la L LaTulippe

Suite 1100, Eag(e Gate Plaza & Office Tower
60 East South Temple, Salt lake City, Utah 84111
Post Office Box 11806, Salt lake City, Utah 84147

A Professional Corporation
Edwin W. Senior (1862-1925)
Clair M. Senior (1901 -1965)

Telephone: (801) 532-1900 - Telecopier (801) 532-1913

Of Counsel

Raymond T. Senior
Milton J. Morris

May 5 ,

1992

Also licensed to Practice in
© Arizona
* California
t Colorado
X Idaho
t Navajo Bar
O New Mexico

• Washington, O.C.

The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen
875 Rio Virgin, Suite 217
St. George, Utah 84770
Re:

Johnson, et al. vs. Nielsen & Senior, et al.
Civil No. 90-0400460-CN

Dear Judge Christoffersen:
We are in receipt of Plaintiffs* Motion for Enlargement of
Time for the purpose of taking the deposition of L. Brent Hoggan.
The Court is advised that the Defendants designated Mr. Hoggan as
an expert witness in November 1991. Prior to April 15, 1992,
Plaintiffs made no attempt to contact Mr. Hoggan or to schedule
his deposition.
Plaintiffs1 delay in taking Mr. Hoggan*s
deposition is without excuse. Nevertheless, Defendant Nielsen &
Senior does not object to Plaintiffs taking Mr. Hoggan's
deposition beyond the discovery cutoff date, on the condition
that the court fix a date certain, within a reasonable time
period, by which said deposition shall be taken and that the
discovery cutoff period not be extended for any other reason,
except for the taking of LizAnne Magleby's deposition as
previously stipulated by counsel.
Should the Court have additional questions or concerns
regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me.
Very truly yours,
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.

LLW:cp
cc:

M i c h a e l L. Dowdle
Darwin C. F i s h e r

16296.NI211.1
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1VJLICHAEL L.

JDOWDLE

ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR

915 WEST 100 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104
TELEPHONE (801) 531-0060 TELECOPIER (801) 531-0346

May 7,1992
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen
875 Rio Virgin Drive #217
SL George, Utah 84770
Re: Johnson v. Nielsen & Senior, et aL, Civil No. 900400460CN
Dear Judge Christoffersen:
This letter is in response to Plaintiffs* Motion for Enlargement of Time, seeking additional
time to take the deposition of Bient Hoggan, designated expert witness for Defendants in this case.
As the Court will note in the file of this case, Defendants designated Mr, Hoggan as an expert
witness in November, 1991f in anticipation of the then-scheduled December trial date. Plaintiffs*
first contact with Mr. Hoggan for the taking of his deposition was on or about April 15,1992.
Plaintiffs made absolutely no attempt to take Mr. Hoggan's deposition prior to that time. We
followed this situation with some interest, wondering when and if Plaintiffs would ever take his
deposition.
Notwithstanding the total lack of merit in the delay in the seeking of Mr. Hoggan's
deposition, Defendant Brian will acquiesce in the belated scheduling, so long as it is clearly
understood that the discovery cut-off now in effect withrespectto the non-counterclaim related
issues willremainin effect As Lany Whyte has noted in his letter to you dated May 5,1992,
counsel have previously agreed that Ms. LizAnne E. Magleby may be deposed after the cutoff date
as well, due to her non-appearance at her deposition earlier in April. Judge Brian objects to the
continual procrastination of the prosecution of this case by Plaintiffs and their counsel. The cutoff
dates previously set by die Court in this case should be adhered to by Plaintiffs just as much as
they should by Defendants. Without the usual and ordinary adherence to cutoff and submission
dates, preparation for trial in this case will be impossible.
We appreciate the Court's patience in the ongoing saga of this case. Please let us know if
we can be of assistance to the Court.
Respectfully, .
Michael L, Dawdle
cc:

Arthur H. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
Darwin C. Fisher

TabF

Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County. State of Utah

C A R M A j B ^ I T H , Clerk

RICHARD C. COXSON (A5933)
Deputy
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
(801) 798-3574
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•\ \JULA*\

JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs .
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN,

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

Defendants.
The court having been fully apprised of the circumstances by
motion and oral argument, enters the following findings of fact:
1.

In January, 1986, Defendant Pat B. Brian
(a)

was a member of the firm of Nielsen & Senior;

(b)

was retained by Plaintiffs to represent them in the
adoption of a child to be born in June, 1986f

(c)

met

with

preliminary

the

birth

commitment

mother
to

and

place

obtained
her

child

her
for

adoption by the Plaintiffs.
2.

Following the birth of the child on June 26, 1986, in

Texas, the child was returned to the State of Utah and placed in
the custody of the Plaintiffs.
3.

Since on or about June 27, 1986, when said child was

delivered to Plaintiffs, it has never been out of the custody, care
and control of the Plaintiffs.

4.

On or about December 19, 1986, the Petitioner for

Adoption by Plaintiffs was filed by Defendant Nielsen & Seniorm
5.

On or about June 23, 1987, Defendant Nielsen & Senior was

informed by the birth mother that she would not give her consent to
the adoption and wished to regain custody of the child.
6.

Plaintiffs

were

immediately

informed

of

the

birth

mother's intention and they sought other counsel who, thereafter
represented them with regard to the adoption.
7.

Between July 1, 1987 and the middle of October, 1987,

there was considerable activity, including court appearances and,
finally, negotiations which resulted in the birth mother being paid
approximately $10,000.00 for alleged expenses she claimed to have
incurred,d including attorney's fees, and the birth mother executed
her formal consent to the adoption.
8.

On October 16, 1987, the Decree of Adoption was entered

by the court and the adoption was completed.
9.

In

November,

1987,

Plaintiffs,

through

their

then

counsel, Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims
for several thousand dollars allegedly incurred by Plaintiffs in
finalizing the adoption at issue in this case. Shortly thereafter,
Plaintiffs wrote a letter to Defendants Nielsen & Senior and Pat
Brian demanding

they be paid damages for the alleged

improper

handling of the adoption.
10.

In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of the law firm of

Howard, Lewis and Petersen in Provo, made contact with Defendants
to assert Plaintiffs' claims regarding the adoption.

11-

Thereafter, direct

contact

was had

with

Plaintiffs

by

Defendants and negotiations were conducted between the parties.
12.

Plaintiffs filed an original complaint, pro se on June

22, 1990.
13.

On or about July 2, 1990, plaintiffs filed their

first

Amended Complaint.
14.

Defendants answered

the first Amended

Complaint

on

or

about July 3 0 , 1990.
15.

Defendant

Nielsen

&

Senior

noticed

plaintiffs

that

depositions were to commence on August 17, 1990.
16.
of

the

On August 16, 1990, Gerald D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie
firm

of

Conder

&

Wangsgard

entered

appearance

and

depositions were postponed.
17.

On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard filed

plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.
18.

The

deposition

of

plaintiff

James

Johnson

began

on

November 2 8 , 1990. The deposition lasted for three ( 3 ) days, after
which the deposition was adjourned due to Mr. Johnson being ill.
19.

On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard withdrew

as counsel for plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen & Senior sent out
a notice to appoint counsel or to appear

in person on January 18,

1991 .
20.
Nielsen

On March 2 1 , 1991, David R.
& Senior

anticipated

indicating

entered

his

that

Irvine wrote to

he had been

appearance

as

counsel

plaintiffs. M r . Irvine did not thereafter enter

Defendant

contacted
of

by

record

appearance.

and
for,

21.
April

A scheduling

conference was schedule by

16, 1991. The conference

the court

was continued at the instance

for
of

Darwin C. Fisher, of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher, who entered appearance
on behalf of plaintiffs on April 15, 1991.
22.

A new scheduling and settlement conference was scheduled

by the court for June 2 6 , 1991, in Logan, Utah. This conference was
held, however, on July
this

conference,

1 2 , 1991. Settlement was not achieved

partially

due

to

the

need

of

counsel

at
for

plaintiffs to familiarize himself with the case.
23.

A

Scheduling

Order

was

entered

on

August

13.

1991 .

setting discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation and
pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10, 1992.
The Order also required that a Pre-trial Order be submitted on or
before January 13, 1992. Defendants' repeated efforts to obtain the
stipulation of plaintiffs' counsel to a proposed Pre-trial

Order

were unsuccessful. Plaintiffs never submitted a proposed Pre-trial
Order to the court.
24.

Plaintiff James Johnson's

deposition by defendants was

delayed until October 1 0 , 1991, and completed on October 11, 1991.
25.

At a hearing

in St. George, Utah on December

6,

1991,

regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Fisher requested delay
of trial set for February 3-10, 1992 until later than month which
was granted and the trial set for February 18, 1992.
26.

Defendant Pat B. Brian then was granted leave in January

of 1992 to file a counterclaim. Counsel for plaintiffs, moved, and
was granted, a new trial date of May 5-14, 1992 in order to

adequately respond to Defendant Pat B. Brian's counterclaim
27.

In February of 1992, the court disposed of certain cause

of action in Plaintiffs 5 Second Amended Complaint, and granted the
same, narrowing the cause of action to professional negligence and
breach of contract.
28.
court

Counsel for plaintiffs, in April of 1992, petitioned the

to

strike

trial

date

set

for

May

due

to

uncompleted

discovery.
29.

Defendants opposed the motion of plaintiffs, but a new

trial date was set for November 2-13, 1992, with a discovery cutoff
date of May 1, 1992.
30.

In April of 1992, counsel for plaintiffs filed a petition

for permission to appeal from and Interlocutory order of the trial
court dismissing certain causes of action.
31.

On April 7, 1992, this court entered an order

striking

the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without date.
32.

The Utah Supreme Court denied plaintiff's Petition

for

Interlocutory Appeal on May 2 1 , 1992.
33.

Plaintiffs moved to extend the discovery cutoff date set

by the court set

for

May 1, 1992. The court

denied

plaintiffs'

request and stated in its Memorandum in Decision dated May 2 0 , 1992
that no exception would be permitted. Defendants opposed
Magleby
pursuant

on

June

3 0 , 1992

to an order

by

without

participation

of

Lizanne

plaintiffs,

this court, in spite of the fact

counsel for plaintiffs was unable to attend.

that

34.

Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case forward

since plaintiffs

took

the deposition

of Brent

Hoggan

in May

of

1992.
35.

The deposition

of M s . Magleby, by defendants, was

the

last action on this case.
36.

On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for

leave to withdraw as plaintiffs* counsel.
37.

Richard

C.

Coxson

entered

appearance

on

behalf

of

plaintiffs on October 26, 1992.
38.

Leave to withdraw was granted by the court on November

19, 1992.
39.

Conduct of the defendants has been satisfactory in moving

the case toward trial having

fully cooperated at all times, and

have tried to bring it to an early resolution and trial.
40.
move the

Plaintiffs have failed to abide by the court's orders to
case

forward

and

seeking

to

expand

the

scope

of

the

action.
41.

During the nearly three years this case has been pending,

plaintiffs have violated

the court's orders

which

completed,

discovery

must

be

setting the date

repeatedly

made

changes

by
of

counsel requiring the court to educate counsel regarding the facts
and

posture

of

the

case,

and,

most

recently,

have

alluded

further amendment and broadening of the claims as originally

to
set

forth by Plaintiffs 5 complaint.

1 fi&fi

42.
and

Plaintiffs are now represented by their seventh attorney

plaintiffs'

failure

to

maintain

counsel

has

resulted

in

prejudice to the defendants.
43.
claimed

The issue remaining to be litigated in this matter is the
negligence

and/or

breach

of contract by defendants

in

connection with plaintiffs' adoption of the minor child.
44.

Any

damages

suffered

by

plaintiffs, which

defendant

dispute, would have been incurred during the three and one-half
months approximately from July 1, 1987 to October 15, 1987 when the
dispute over the adoption was settled.
Having made its Findings of Fact, the court now enters:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure empowers

this court to dismiss an action, with prejudice for failure of the
plaintiffs to prosecute.
2.

Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within

the broad discretion of the trial court.
3.

The single issue presently before the court is whether

the Motion to Dismiss is sufficiently supported by the facts of the
case and any allegations of the plaintiffs regarding contacts with
or by ecclesiastical authorities or with state and federal agencies
are not relevant to Defendants' Motion and will not be considered
by the court.
4.

The factors

to be considered

in determining

whether

dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate are set forth in

Suppl y_Co^.

Uest inghouse Electrical
Inc. 544 P.2d

v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor ^

876 (Utah 1975) and restated by the Utah Court of

Appeals in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App . 1989).
5.

The court has considered those factors in determining

whether to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, as follow:
a.

With respect to Factor ( 1 ) , the Lapse of Time, the court

concludes that a considerable

lapse of time has occurred

in this

case, almost five and one-half years since the claims were first
made by plaintiffs against defendants, and over two and

one-half

years since the filing of the original complaint. While this is not
the deciding factor in the court's analysis, it is of significance
to the court.
b.
the

With respect to Factor ( 2 ) , the Conduct of the Parties,

court

concludes

that

defendants

have

consistently

and

continuously moved the case forward through conducting discovery,
narrowing the scope

and the case

through pre-trial motions, and

cooperating with the court and opposing
court cut-off

dates and

counsel

in adherence

deadlines. In contrast, plaintiffs

to

have

persisted in delaying and prolonging the prosecution of the case
through the regular replacement of counsel, requiring
of

new

counsel

in

each

instance,

and

through

re-education

continual

and

persistent attempt to extend cut-off dates and deadlines, to expand
the scope of discovery and to introduce new issues into the case.
Weighing the conduct of the parties, the court concludes that this
factor weighs heavily in favor of defendants.

IS

c.

With respect to Factors (3) and ( 4 ) , the Opportunity to

Move the Case Forward and the Actions of the Parties to Do So, the
court concludes that all parties

in this case

have had equal

opportunity to move the case forward to trial. For the same reasons
as stated in subparagraph (b) above, the court concludes that
defendants have taken advantage of their opportunity to move the
case forward in every instance. In contrast, and in the face of
their primary burden to do so, plaintiffs have failed to move the
case forward to trial, and have, rather, obstructed defendants' and
the court's efforts to do so in virtually every instance. Weighing
the opportunity to move the case forward and the actions of the
parties in doing so, the court concludes that this factor weighs
heavily in favor of defendants.
d.

With respect to Factor ( 5 ) , the Difficulty and Prejudice

of the Parties, the court concludes that both sides of this case
have been prejudiced by the failure to move this case toward trial.
The court has concluded, however, that the fault for the difficulty
and prejudice
instance.

suffered

by the parties

Plaintiffs' actions

in

the

is plaintiffs' in every
constant

replacement

of

counsel , and attempts to delay and broaden the scope of discovery
and issues in the case are entirely to blame for the difficulty and
prejudice suffered by the parties. Weighing the difficulty

and

prejudice to the parties, and to the court, the court concludes
that this factor weighs heavily in favor of defendants.
e.

With

respect

to Factor

( 6 ) , the

Injustice Which May

Result from Dismissal, the court concludes that no injustice will

result to the plaintiffs

in this case. The issue remaining to be

litigated in this matter is the claimed negligence and/or breach of
contract by defendants in connection with adoption by plaintiffs of
the minor child. The child has never been out of the plaintiffs'
custody, and the adoption was finalized within three and one-half
months of the making of the original claim by the natural mother to
obtain custody. The court concludes that only minor monetary costs
could have been incurred by plaintiffs with new counsel to finalize
the

adoption. Even

these

having been unnecessarily
have completed

amounts are disputed

by defendants

incurred, since Nielsen & Senior

the adoption. The court concludes that

as

could

plaintiffs

conduct in this case had been the cause of delay, difficulty

and

prejudice suffered in this case, and that no injustice will result
from the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims with prejudice.
6.

Plaintiffs' conduct

constitutes

abuse of

the

process as set forth in Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d
App.

judicial
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(Utah

1989).
7.

Dismissal of plaintiffs' case with prejudice and on the

merits is justified by plaintiffs' dilatory conduct as set forth in
Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah App. 1992).
8.

Following

dismissal

of

plaintiffs'

Complaint,

the

counterclaim of defendant Brian should be dismissed also.
9.

All

specifically,

other

outstanding

plaintiffs'

Request

motions
for

before

Admissions,

the

court,

plaintiff's

Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants'

loo;

Objections to Requests for Admissions, and Defendants' Motion for
Sanctions are,
10.

likewise, rendered moot.

Defendants are entitled to their costs herein incurred.

DATED this

day of

, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing,

JUDGEMENT

OF

DISMISSAL

and

FINDINGS

OF -FACT

AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, postage prepaid to:
Arthur J. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorney for defendants
60 East South Temple
Eagle Gate Tower, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

DATED tthis
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
Larry L. Whyte (4942)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
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Attorneys for Defendants Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAKES A- JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 900400460CN
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,

Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants•
Pursuant to Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
through its counsel of record, Arthur H. Nielsen and Larry L.
Whyte, Defendant Nielsen & Senior moves the Court to dismiss with
prejudice and on the merits Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to
prosecute their claim with diligence.

This Motion is supported

by the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith.

^ 9
DATED this ^)^^day of February, 1993.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

By

fii

J^J^

m

/r\ /^-

.Jo-l

Arthur H. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^ ^\ day of February, 1993, I
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, firstclass postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT addressed as follows:
Richard C. Coxson, A5933
Attorney for Plaintiffs
2 75 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
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Arthur H. Nielsen (2405)
Larry L. Whyte (4942)
Marilynn P. Fineshriber (4571)
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen & Senior
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 532-1900
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

;
]i
i
;,
i
]i

Plaintiffs,
v.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, Pat B. Brian,
Defendants.

]i
;
I
]

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendant Nielsen & Senior submits the following Memorandum
in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint with prejudice and on the merits.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendants submit the following facts which are established
by the record of this matter:
1.

In November, 1987, Plaintiffs, through their counsel,

Mark F. Robinson, contacted Defendants to assert claims for
several thousand dollars allegedly spent by Plaintiffs to
finalize the adoption at issue in this case.

Shortly thereafter,

Mr. Robinson discontinued his representation of Plaintiffs.

2.

In August, 1988, D. David Lambert of Howard, Lewis and

Petersen, made contact with Defendants to assert Plaintiffs'
claims regarding the adoption.

At this time, Plaintiffs were

demanding payment of $47,000.00.

Defendants met with Mr. Lambert

to discuss the possible resolution of Plaintiffs' claims.

On

February 17, 1989, Mr. Lambert's representation of Plaintiffs was
terminated by Plaintiffs.
3.

In 1989, Plaintiffs contacted officials of the Church

of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to bring pressure to bear
upon Defendant Brian to capitulate to Plaintiffs' demands.
Meetings were held between Plaintiffs, Defendant Brian, and
Church officials.

During this period, Plaintiffs alternated

claiming that they were representing themselves or that they had
retained counsel.

At this time, Plaintiffs set their claims at

an amount in excess of $87,000.00.
4.

Plaintiffs' original complaint in this matter was

filed, pro se, on June 22, 1990.

It contained claims for

negligence, violation of child placement laws, breach of
covenants of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation,
intentional infliction and negligent infliction of emotional
distress and breach of contract, and sought damages of an
undisclosed amount.

On or about July 2, 1990, Plaintiffs filed

their first Amended Complaint, which contained the same claims
for relief.
- 2 17969.NI211.8500

5.

During the spring and summer of 1990, Plaintiffs

claimed to be searching for legal counsel to represent them
against Defendants.

Plaintiffs publicized the matter by

contacting scores of lawyers and law firms, sending out packets
of information which contained, among other things, their claims
against Defendant Brian then pending before the Utah State Bar.
6.

On or about July 13, 1990, Defendants received a letter

from D. Lanny Waite, a Las Vegas, Nevada, attorney who claimed to
represent Plaintiffs in this matter.

Mr. Waite1s letter proposed

settlement of the claims for $180,000.00, and expressed his
anticipation that the media attention already given to the case
would increase due to Judge Brian's position.

Plaintiffs later

denied that Mr. Waite represented them.
7.

Defendants answered the First Amended Complaint and on

or about July 30, 1990, Defendant Nielsen & Senior noticed the
Plaintiffs' depositions, to commence on August 17, 1990.

On

August 16, 1990, the day before the scheduled depositions, Jerold
D. Conder and Peter L. Rognlie of the law firm of Conder &
Wangsgard entered their appearance as counsel for Plaintiffs, and
the scheduled depositions were postponed until they could become
familiar with the case.
8.

On or about September 12, 1990, Conder & Wangsgard

filed Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, alleging professional
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malpractice, breach of contract, negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent
misrepresentation.
9.

The deposition of Plaintiff James Johnson finally began

on November 28, 1990, more than three months after it was
originally scheduled.

The deposition lasted for three (3) days,

until November 30, 1990, at which time a rift developed between
Plaintiffs and their counsel over the course of the discovery and
the case in general.

The deposition was adjourned by Plaintiffs'

counsel, indicating that Mr. Johnson was ill.
10.

On or about January 16, 1991, Conder & Wangsgard

withdrew as counsel for Plaintiffs, and Defendant Nielsen &
Senior sent out a notice to appoint counsel or to appear in
person on January 18, 1991.
11.

On March 21, 1991, David R. Irvine wrote to Defendant

Nielsen & Senior, indicating that he anticipated entering his
appearance as counsel of record for Plaintiffs, and inquiring
regarding a resolution of this matter by settlement.
Notwithstanding the letter and preliminary discussions, Mr.
Irvine did not enter an appearance for Plaintiffs as counsel in
the case.
12.

A scheduling conference was scheduled by the Court on

- 4 17969.NI211.8500

April 16, 1991.

The conference was continued when Darwin C.

Fisher of Nielsen, Hill & Fisher entered an appearance on behalf
of Plaintiffs on April 15, 1991.
13.

A new scheduling and settlement conference was

scheduled by the Court on June 26, 1991, in Logan, Utah.

This

conference was held, however, on July 12, 1991, and Plaintiffs'
counsel demurred on all discussions of a resolution of the case
due to his need to familiarize himself with the case.

A

scheduling order was entered by this Court on August 13, 1991,
setting discovery and motion cutoff, expert witness designation
and pretrial conference dates, and a trial date of February 3-10,
1992.
14.

Notwithstanding Defendants' numerous attempts to

complete Plaintiffs* depositions, continuation of the deposition
of Plaintiff James Johnson was delayed until October 10, 1991.
The reasons given for the delay were that Mr. Fisher was unable
to become sufficiently familiar with facts of the case before the
deposition.

The deposition examination was finally concluded on

October 11, 1991, almost a year after it was begun.
15.

A hearing was held in St. George, Utah on December

6,

1991, regarding Defendants' motions to dismiss, or in the
alternative for summary judgment as to various of the causes of
action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

At the hearing,

also, the parties discussed resolution of the case.

Mr. Fisher
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requested delay of the trial set for February 3-10, 1992, until
later that month.
16.

Various scheduling dates were again set,

Pursuant to this Court's Order of January, 1992,

Defendant Pat B. Brian was granted leave to file a Counterclaim.
Upon motion of Plaintiffs' counsel, the trial date of February
18-28, 1992, was stricken and the trial set for May 5 through 14,
1992.
17.

In February, 1992, this Court heard Defendants' motions

to dispose of certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second
Amended Complaint.

Subsequent to this hearing, in April, 1992,

counsel for Plaintiffs entreated the Court to strike the trial
date set for May on the basis that discovery was still necessary
to complete preparations for trial, that counsel could not be
ready for the trial in so short a time, and that certain
conflicts existed which necessitated that the date be re-set.
Although opposed by Defendants, the motion to strike the trial
date was granted by the Court.

A new trial date was set for

November 2-13, 1992, and the discovery cut-off date was extended
through May, 1992.
18.

In April, 1992, counsel for Plaintiffs filed with the

Utah Supreme Court a petition for permission to appeal an
interlocutory order of the trial Court with regard to its rulings
dismissing certain causes of action in Plaintiffs' Second Amended
Complaint.

On April 7, 1992, this Court entered an order
- 6 -
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striking the scheduling order, and continuing the trial, without
date.

The Utah Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' petition on

May 21, 1992.
19.

During discovery proceedings, Plaintiff gave notice of

taking the deposition of Lizanne Magleby.
Ms. Magleby did not appear.
deposition.

On the date scheduled,

Counsel agreed to reschedule the

Thereafter, Plaintiffs cancelled Ms. Magleby's

deposition.
20.

Thereafter, Defendants noticed the taking of the

deposition of Ms. Magleby, whereupon Plaintiffs refused to
cooperate in making Ms. Magleby available for the deposition.
Defendants were required to obtain leave of the Court to depose
Ms. Magleby after the discovery cut-off, notwithstanding that it
was Plaintiff's dilatory conduct which delayed the scheduling of
the deposition.

The deposition was set for June 30, 1990.

Plaintiffs moved, again, to delay on the grounds that their
counsel would be unable to attend.

The matter was argued to the

court on June 25, 1992, and an Order entered that the deposition
proceed as scheduled.
21.

Plaintiffs have taken no action to move this case

forward since Plaintiffs took the deposition of Brent Hoggan in
February, 1992, approximately one year ago.
22.

The deposition of Ms. Magleby, by Defendants, was the

last action on the case.
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23.

On or about October 5, 1992, Darwin C. Fisher moved for

a leave to withdraw as Plaintiffs counsel.

Defendant Brian

opposed the Motion, arguing that further delay, prejudicial to
Defendants, would ensue.

Mr. Fisher's Motion was granted and the

appearance of Richard Coxson as counsel for Plaintiffs was
acknowledged by the Court on November 19, 1992.
24.

Defendants have not asked for a continuance at any time

during these protracted proceedings and have consistently
represented to the Court their readiness for trial.
ARGUMENT
I
PLAINTIFFS' DILATORY CONDUCT WARRANTS
DISMISSAL OF THEIR CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE AND ON THE MERITS
Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, empowers this
Court to dismiss an action, with prejudice and on the merits, for
failure of the Plaintiff to prosecute.

"The burden is upon the

Plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or
unreasonable delay."

Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc. v.

Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987)
(quoting Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual Irrigation
Co., 698 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Colo. 1985)).

Plaintiffs must

"prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept the penalty
of dismissal."

Id., (quoting Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323,

1325 (Utah 1975)).

Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a

decision within the broad discretion of the trial court.
- 8 17969.NI211.8500

Id.

The Court of Appeals has held that it will not interfere with the
trial court's decision unless it clearly appears that the Court
has abused its discretion and that there is a likelihood that
injustice resulted.

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court provided the trial courts with
guidance on Rule 41(b) dismissals in Westinghouse Electrical
Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1975).

In that case, the Court reviewed a Rule 41(b)

dismissal for failure to prosecute and identified the factors to
be considered in determining whether such a dismissal is
appropriate.

Those factors were articulated recently by the

Court of Appeals as follows:
The Westinghouse court delineated five factors in
addition to the length of time elapsed to determine the
propriety of a dismissal for failure to prosecute: (1)
the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each
party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each
party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount
of difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to
the other side; and (5) "most important, whether
injustice may result from the dismissal."
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216, 1219
(Utah App. 1991).

The following facts of Plaintiffs' conduct are

undisputed and establish that dismissal is proper, pursuant to
Westinghouse.

- 9 17969. Ik 1211.8500

A.

Plaintiffs' conduct has repeatedly delayed the movement of
this matter to trial while Defendants have consistently
moved the case forward.
As the facts of this Memorandum illustrate, Plaintiffs have

failed to move the case forward.

Plaintiffs have been

represented by numerous attorneys in this matter, the withdrawal
of each resulting in delay.

Plaintiffs have amended their

Complaint twice, and have, three times, requested a continuance
of a trial setting.

Plaintiff James Johnson's deposition was

rescheduled several times and finally completed more than a year
after noticed.

In April, 1992, Plaintiffs filed with the Utah

Supreme Court a petition for interlocutory appeal, which required
that the fourth trial setting for November, 1992, be stricken.
Although the petition was denied and Plaintiffs were free to
proceed with their case, Plaintiffs have taken no action at all
since February, 1992.
Even this abbreviated listing of facts demonstrates the
Plaintiffs' lack of determination to move the case forward to
trial.

Defendants, however, have proceeded with the case,

pursuing discovery, narrowing the issues for trial by Motion, and
consistently representing to the Court their readiness for trial.
Defendants have moved the case forward whenever there has been
opportunity to do so.

- 10 17969.N1211.8500

B.

Plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the case with diligence
caused difficulty and prejudice to Defendants,
Plaintiffs' numerous changes of counsel, amendments to

pleadings, reluctant compliance with Defendants* discovery
requests and inability to go forward with trial when set have
greatly increased Defendants* burden of defending this action.
Defendants have been deprived of the benefits of a prompt
resolution of the claims against them.

Delay has made the

presentation of evidence at trial more difficult, prejudicing
Defendants, whose defenses require the accurate testimony of
third parties who may become unavailable with the passage of
time.

Further, delay has unnecessarily increased the cost of

defense.
Defendants have lived more than five and one-half years with
the Plaintiffs' threats and harrassment.

Defendants have

prepared to respond to Plaintiffs' claims on the merits but
Plaintiffs have stalled every effort to place the matter before
the Court•
C.

Dismissal will not result in injustice to Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs must diligently prosecute their claims or accept

the penalty of dismissal.

Charlie Brown Construction Co., Inc.

v. Leisure Sports Incorporated, 740 P.2d at 1370.

Such dismissal

is not unjust when it is Plaintiffs' conduct alone that invites
dismissal or could have avoided it.

The Plaintiffs in this case

have shown no determination to get their claims resolved on the
- 11 17969.NI211.8500

merits.

Presumably, they are aware of the consequences of their

lack of diligence.
Defendants acknowledge that this Court must "balance the
need to expedite litigation and efficiently utilize judicial
resources with the need to allow parties to have their day in
court."

Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d

1216, 1219 (Utah App. 1991).

Notwithstanding, when the facts of

this matter are evaluated against the factors set forth in
Westinghouse, dismissal is, clearly, just.
II
DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE WOULD BE CONSISTENT
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS OF UTAH COURTS
In Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1989), the
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal of Maxfield's
Complaint for lack of prosecution.
Court were these:

The facts considered by the

The plaintiff filed his Complaint in 1980 and

amended it twice, each time adding new theories of the case.
at 239.

Id.

Plaintiff moved for summary judgment three times and

filed an interlocutory appeal for the trial Court's refusal to
grant it.

The appeal was denied by the Supreme Court.

plaintiff's attorneys withdrew from representation.
objected to all three of the trial dates set.

Two of

Plaintiffs

When plaintiff

moved to amend the Complaint a third time and, at the same time,
his third attorney moved to withdraw, the trial court dismissed
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the action for failure to prosecute the action in a timely
manner.

Id.

The Court of Appeals reviewed the facts in light of the_
Westinghouse factors, stating that "there is more to consider in
determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper
than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed."
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 237 (quoting Westinghouse
Electrical Supply Co., 544 P.2d at 879). With regard to the
issue of injustice, the- court held:
[W]hile we recognize that injustice could result
from dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose
whatever interest he may have in the disputed property
without having the opportunity to argue his case on its
merits, we conclude that he had more than ample
opportunity to prove his asserted interest and simply
failed to do so. Such nonaction is inexcusable, not
only from the standpoint of the parties, but also
because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process.
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240-241.

It is apparent that

the court did not eguate the activity in the case with timely
prosecution.
The special concurrence of Judge Orme is particularly
pertinent to the case at hand.

The concurring opinion identified

the following conduct of plaintiff as determinative:
Maxfield's latest counsel's motion for leave to
withdraw coupled with his motion for leave to file yet
another amended complaint constituted, taken together,
a concession by Maxfield that he was nowhere near being
ready to try his case in the matter for a few days even
though the action had been pending for the better part
of a decade. It is the length of time this action had
been pending, coupled with Maxfield's obvious
- 13 17969-*1211.8500

unreadiness that makes sua sponte dismissal appropriate
in this case.
Maxfield v. Rushtonf 779 P.2d at 241.
Plaintiffs began a course of threats and harrassment toward
Defendants nearly five and one-half years ago.

Defendants

received demands for payment, by Plaintiffs or by counsel on
their behalf, for nearly three years before the original
Complaint was filed.

The action has been pending for two and

one-half years, during which time Defendants have diligently
prepared for trial.

Plaintiffs have not prepared for trial, but

have pressed Defendants with their demands for ever increasing
amounts of damages.

Defendants are entitled to an end to

threats, by resolution of this matter.
This Court is, also, entitled to relief.

As in Maxfield.

Plaintiffs' nonaction is inexcusable not only from Defendants'
standpoint, but because it constitutes abuse of the judicial
process.

Dismissal, therefore, would be consistent with the

precedents of the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The Westinghouse factors remain the standard governing
dismissal, whether the trial court dismisses, sua sponte, an
action for failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 4-103, or upon
motion, pursuant to Rule 41(b).

Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State

University, 813 P.2d 1216 1219 (Utah App. 1991).

As Defendants

have demonstrated above, an examination of the facts of this case
in light of those factors supports dismissal of this action with
- 14 17969.NI211.8500

prejudice and on the merits.

It is within this Court's

discretion to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Resolution of this matter is long overdue.

For the reasons

set forth above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs'
Complaint for failure to prosecute should be granted.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of February, 1993.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Arthnr H. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
Marilynn P. Fineshriber
Attorneys for Defendant Nielsen &
Senior
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of February, 1993, I
have caused to be sent, through the United States mails, firstclass postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S SECONDED AMENDED COMPLAINT
addressed as follows:
Richard C. Coxson, A5933
Attorney for Plaintiffs
275 North Main
Spanish Fork, UT 84660
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- 15 17969.NI211.8500

TabH

FILED
0

0

3

nf ^^' ' '

Dlstric

^ ' ^
* Court

JS^SE founty, State of Utah
CARM
"TITH, Clerk
Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON a n d JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM
DECISION

vs.

NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
corporation, PAT B. BRIAN
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,

Civil No. 900400460CN

Defendants.

The Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Extend Discovery.
Discovery seems to have been a problem all of the way through
this extended trial in attempting to get it to Court.

There have

been extension after extension, the Court finally issued its
Order fixing a discovery cut-off date with the exception of
LizAnne Magelby's deposition as stipulated by counsel.

The Court

does not plan to deviate any further from the Order that sets
discovery cut-off dates.

No exception will be given.

1

Therefore, the Motion to Extend Discovery is denied.
Counsel for Defendants is directed to prepare an appropriate
Order.

Forward same to the Court with a stamped, self-addressed

envelope and it will be returned,
DATED this

Mk

d a y of Mafcr, 19#2,

VENOY CHI
SENIOR DISTRICT'JUpGE

2

MAILING CERTIFICATE

<35tL
day of May,
I hereby certify that on this
1992, I mailed true and correct copies of the above and foregoing
Memorandum Decision, first-class postage prepaid, to the
following:
Arthur H. Nielsen, Esq.
Larry L. Whyte, Esq.
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Darwin C. Fisher, Esq.
3319 North University #200
Provo, UT 84 604

Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
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L a r r y L. Whyte (4942)
ounh Judicial District Court
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P . C .
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A t t o r n e y s for Defendant N i e l s e n & S e n i o r Af!MA B. $ M 0 J * ' ^ ' e ' K
60 E a s t South Temple
_ 'ESZ3?7 Deputy
Eagle Gate Tower, S u i t e 1100
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone No.:

(801) 532-1900

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES A. JOHNSON and JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON,

ORDER
EXTENDING DISCOVERY CUT-OFF

Plaintiffs,
Civil No.: 900400460CN
v.

Judge VeNoy Christoffersen

NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
corporation; PAT B. BRIAN, and
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ,
Defendants.

This matter, having come on before the above-entitled Court,
on the

3rd day

of April,

1992, by telephone conference on

Plaintiffs' Motion to Extend Discovery Cut-off, Darwin C. Fisher
of Hill, Hill & Fisher, representing the Plaintiffs, Michael L.
Dowdle, representing

Defendant

Pat

B. Brian, and Arthur

H.

Nielsen and Larry L. Whyte of Nielsen & Senior representing
Defendant Nielsen & Senior, and the Court having heard arguments
of counsel and having read the records and files herein, and
being fully advised in the premises,

11998

NOW

THEREFORE,

IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED

that

all

discovery

relating, pertaining to or arising out of Plaintiffs' Complaint
shall be completed by May 1, 1992.
DATED this

/

day of

/til

</,

1992.

BY THE COUR'p:
/

k±

Honorable Ve,
iNoy Christoffersen
Approved as to form:

Darwin C. Fisher
HILL, HILL & FISHER
Counsel for Plaintiffs

pw*dtot&

Michael L. Docile
Counsel for Defendant Brian

Arthdr Y^c Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte

Counsel for N i e l s e n & S e n i o r

-211998

CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

cyC/LI> day of April, 1992, I

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER EXTENDING
DISCOVERY CUT-OFF by causing the same to be sent via first class
mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Darwin C. Fisher, Esq,
HILL, HILL & FISHER
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
\

,^ry

'

/ /
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Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080
HILL, HILL & FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

]
I

MOTION TO EXTEND DISCOVERY

i
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, i

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Defendants.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs James A. Johnson and Jennifer L.
Johnson, by and through their attorney of record, Darwin C. Fisher,
and moves this Court for an Order to extend the discovery date on
the grounds that:
1.

Depositions of the natural mother, Lizanne Magleby, and

Defendant's expert witness, L. Brent Hoggan, were unable to be
taken by the Plaintiff prior to the discovery cut-off.
This Motion is based upon the records and files herein and the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavits filed herewith.

i aaa

DATED this

/T

A/i^LOy

day of

, 1992,

DARWIN C. FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify
foregoing on this

that I personally mailed a copy of

/J*

day of

JA&<r

§

the

1992, by

first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Judge Pat B. Brian
c/o Michael Dowdle
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84104

Arthur Nielsen
Larry Whyte
Nielsen & Senior
60 E. South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Judge VeNoy Christofferson
875 Rio Virgin, #217
St. George, Utah 84770
Jcimes A. and Jennifer L. Johnson

L:\CLIENTDF\DAVISSTV.ADO\discexte.mot

1665

tj 1Z i ii .*--

L~i

Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAMES A* JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

]|
)

AFFIDAVIT OF
DARWIN C. FISHER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
I
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, 1

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants,
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF UTAH )

ss:

I, Darwin C. Fisher, being first duly sworn, deposes and
states:
1.

I am

the

attorney

for

the

Plaintiffs

in

the

above

entitled matter.
2.

I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit.

All the statements hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit are made
by me on the basis of my personal and direct knowledge of the
matter to which said statements pertain.
1

If called as a witness by

a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able and shall testify as
to each and all of said matters in the manner hereinafter set forth
in this Affidavit*
3.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the

State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years.
4.

I was informed that Mr. L. Brent Hoggan, the defendants'

expert witness, would not be available for the taking of his
deposition until the last week of April, 1992.
5.

That

your

affiant

contacted

Mr. Whyte, counsel

for

Nielsen & Senior, and was told that defendants would not agree to
an extension of the discovery cut-off date and the deposition of
Mr. Hoggan must be taken within the last week of April, 1992 prior
to May 1, 1992.
6.

That your affiant informed Mr. Whyte that he would make

every effort in order to take Mr. Hoggan's deposition, however,
your affiant was in trial from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

After 5:00

p.m. your affiant was occupied in preparing for the next day's
trial.

That your affiant was unable to take the deposition during

the last week of April, 1992, because of your affiant's involvement
in trial in another matter.
1.

That

defendants' counsel

was

fully

aware

that

your

affiant was to be involved in the jury trial from the 7th day of
April, 1992, as defendants' counsel was working closely with the
2

counsel for the defendants in the other matter and knew that your
affiant had entered an appearance to act as co-counsel in that
matter*
8.

It is apparent to your affiant that defendants

have

prohibited the taking of the deposition of their expert witness by
requiring the deposition to be taken the last few days of April
1992.
is
DATED this

jdg^

c/

day of

.,

1992.

v J v >*->vh^
Darwin C. Fisher
STATE OF UTAH

ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH
On this
appeared

before me

)

day of

„^w

Darwin C. Fisher,

m,

1992, personally

signer of the

foregoing

instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
SYLVIA A, BUNDRANT
HOTW PUBLIC* STATE dUTAH
3319 NORTH UMV.AVE. #200
NiEtSONHOL&RSHER

Y PUBLIC

PROVO.UTAH 84604

COMM. EXP. 1-20-96

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid
a true and correct copy of the foregoing on this
djdCl^

T7

, 1992, to the following:
Arthur H. Nielsen
Larry L. Whyte
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Pat B. Brian
c/o Michael L. Dowdle
915 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84104
James A. and Jennifer L. Johnson
and a courtesy copy of same to:
The Honorable Venoy Christofferson
875 Rio Virgin #217
St. George, Utah 84770

Wu

la Bundrant
1:\clientdf\davisatv.ado\af£ad6.dcf

4

^r

day of

c

•

•*•

lit

v,*-.

Darwin C. Fisher, Bar No. 1080
HILL, HILL & FISHER
Attorney for Plaintiff
Jamestown Square, Suite 200
3319 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
\
\

JAMES A. JOHNSON and
JENNIFER L. JOHNSON,

AFFIDAVIT OF SYLVIA BUNDRANT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
NIELSON & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation and PAT B. BRIAN, i

Civil No. 900400460CN
Judge VeNoy Christofferson

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
)

COUNTY OF UTAH

ss:

SYLVIA BUNDRANT, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and
says:
1.

I am the paralegal/secretary for plaintiffs' counsel,

Darwin C. Fisher*
2.

I am of adult years and competent to make this Affidavit.

3.

All

the

statements

hereinafter

set

forth

in

this

Affidavit are made by me on the basis of my personal and direct
knowledge of the matter to which said statements pertain.

If

called as a witness by a Court of competent jurisdiction, I am able
and shall testify as to each and all of said matters in the manner
hereinafter set forth in this Affidavit.
4.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the

State of Utah and am over the age of 18 years.
5.

Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert

witness, Mr. L. Brent Hoggan's secretary on the 15th day of April,
1992,

to try and set a time for his deposition.

I was then

informed by a return call from his office that he would not be
available until the last week in April.
6.

Your affiant tried to contact the defendants' expert

witness, Mr. Hoggan, on the 30th day of April, 1992 to try and set
a time for his deposition and Mr. Hoggan was unavailable.
DATED this

T

day of Maj-a 1992.

STATE OF UTAH
ss.

COUNTY OF UTAH

On this

yWi_

day of May, 1992, personally appeared before me

Sylvia A. Bundrant, signer of the foregoing instrument, who duly
acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
NOTri^r RJBdC

TONYA R. ADAMS
P.O.Box 283
Orem. Utah 84059
My Commission Expires. 8-22-94
State of Utah
SS<3?5$SSSSSSSSSSSS3SS

\AArM~~~
NOTARY PUBLIC

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I personally mailed a copy of the
foregoing on this

yp

A/(6M/K

day of

, 1992, by

first-class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Judge Pat B. Brian
c/o Mark Dowdle
615 W. 200 S.
Salt Lake City, UT

84111

Arthur Nielsen
Larry Whyte
Nielsen & Senior
60 E. South Temple #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

\clientdf\johnson\affidav.sab
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D I S T ^ C T ' '
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

JAMES A, JOHNSON, JENNIFER
L. JOHNSON, AND CHILD JOHNSON
Plaintiffs,
VS.
NIELSEN & SENIOR, a Utah
Corporation, PAT B. BRIAN
and CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ
Defendants.

MINUTE ENTRY
Fourth District Case
900400460 CN
DATE: July 12, 1991
HONORABLE V. Christofferson
COURT REPORTER: Pratt, Joanne
COURT CLERK: PAM

TYPE OF HEARING: SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
PRESENT: PLAINTIFFS, ATP FISHER, ATD DOWDLE, ATD SCHMUTZ
ATD WHYTE, DEF ARTHUR NEILSON, DEF JUDGE BRIAN
This is the time set for the Settlement & Pre-Trial Conference in
the above Fourth District case. Honorable Venoy Christofferson is
presiding, conference is held in chambers with counsel. Plaintiffs
are present in the courtroom, but do not wish to be present in
chambers* Jury trial dates are rescheduled to February 17-28 in the
4th District. Status, depositions and cut off dates are discussed.
Expert witnesses' depositions to be taken, plaintiff to notify by
November 1, 1991 and defendants to notify by November 15, 1991.
Discovery and Interrogatories to be completed by December 30, 1991
and a Pre-Trial Conference to be held in St. George on January 24,
1991 at 10:00am. Counsel to stipulate to exhibits and witnesses.
Issues of damages and PTSS, damages shown, adoption after this
adoption, unrelated accident also in litigation, causation, fraud,
emotional distress and bankruptcy discussed. Motions to be filed in
this First District Court with hearing to be set if requested.
Attorney fees and adoption fees owing or dismissed through
bankruptcy.
Today's order to be prepared by Attorney Whyte.
Motions for Summary Judgment may enter.

